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ABSTRACT 
Tax avoidance may be an inevitable consequence of taxation; however, it remains 
a great drain on the fiscus. There are many ways in which the Commissioner may 
attack avoidance arrangements in order to lessen the drain on the fiscus. One 
manner in which the Commissioner may attack avoidance arrangements is through 
the doctrine of simulated transactions. Given that the simulated transactions 
doctrine is ordinarily a contract law doctrine and not strictly speaking a tax law 
mechanism one might wonder how this area of law might develop into an anti-
avoidance mechanism. This contribution sought to understand how the doctrine 
may develop as an anti-avoidance mechanism through an analysis of the 
development of the case law in regards to the development of the doctrine in order 
to ascertain how it has developed into a common-law anti-avoidance rule. In this 
regard selected cases were discussed which highlighted firstly the genesis of the 
simulated transactions doctrine in our law (Chapter 2) and selected cases were 
discussed that highlighted the simulated transactions doctrine’s development and 
use as an anti-avoidance mechanism (Chapter 3) and finally the courts acceptance 
and treatment of this development and how this development was discussed in the 
literature was also discussed (Chapter 4) It was concluded that whilst the doctrine 
can be developed quite extensively as an anti-avoidance mechanism the courts are 
unlikely to develop same into a broad common-law General Anti-Avoidance Rule.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Broadly speaking, the substance over form principle is the principle that allows the 
court to strip away or disregard the outward form of a transaction and give effect to 
what the court determines is the actual, substantive transaction; the principle is 
expressed in the maxim plus valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur 
meaning “(‘greater value is attached to what is done than to what appears to be 
done’)…in simple language this may be rendered as ‘true facts have more value 
than apparent facts’ or ‘substance bears more weight than form’.”1 Secondly, the 
term in fraudem legis refers to acts done that comply with the letter of the law but 
are designed to nevertheless defeat the spirit or purpose of the law.2 This of course 
then begs the question as to whether a person may ever remain outside of the 
purview of legislation, can a person ever arrange their affairs so as not to fall within 
the wording of a statute? Relatedly, a simulated transaction may be said to be one 
that is entered into without any intention to give effect to the agreement, or to some 
of its terms, and the parties have some other real agreement that will give effect to, 
despite the purported agreement.3 A simulated transaction, then, is one in which 
the authenticity of the parties intentions to contract on the terms of the supposed 
agreement is called into question.4 Thus it may be said then that the simulated 
transactions doctrine enjoins a court to set aside a supposed transaction and 
uphold or apply what is found to be the real transaction between the parties; the 
jurisdictional fact that allows the court to disregard the form of the agreement being 
the dissonance between what is seen as the real intentions of the parties which 
must differ from the supposed intention. Thus understood it seems that simulated 
transactions principle and the fraudem legis principle both have their genesis in the 
plus valet maxim, both being concerned with the substance of a transaction as 
opposed to merely the form or wording in which it is couched. The two principles 
differ however in that simulated transactions the parties do not really intend the 
1 B C Plant Hire cc t/a B C Carriers v Grenco (SA) (Pty) Ltd [2004] 1 All SA 612 (C) at para 33 
2 Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) at pg648 
3 Williams, R.C. Income Tax in South Africa Cases and Materials (2009) 3rd ed LexisNexis: South Africa at p. 
562 
4 Hutchison, A & Hutchison, D “Simulated Transactions and the Fraus Legis Doctrine” 131 South African Law 
Journal 69 (2014) at pg. 70 
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outward appearance of the agreement whereas arguably the very nature of 
transactions in fraudem legis are intended to be what in form they purport to be, 
simulated agreements then are ineffective for lack of serious intent whereas 
agreements in fraudem legis are ineffective or invalid due to their outward effects – 
circumventing the spirit of the law. However, as will be shown in the chapters below 
the two principles of simulation and fraudem legis have become somewhat 
jurisprudentially entwined.  
Further, The South African Revenue Services defines impermissible tax avoidance 
as arrangements that are artificially contrived such that they have no or negligible 
economic value.5 It may also be said that tax avoidance exists on some spectrum 
from permissible to impermissible tax avoidance, the exact delineating point at 
which tax avoidance becomes impermissible may not be precisely defined.6 Whilst 
there may be certain factors that are indicative of impermissible tax avoidance the 
only definitional element, that is to say the only necessary feature of impermissible 
tax avoidance is that it is an arrangement that is seen as inconsistent with the 
statutory purpose of the taxing legislation.7 
Given the above then this thesis looks to answer the question as to how the 
simulated transactions doctrine was developed in the common law as a means of 
combatting impermissible tax avoidance. The question to be discussed and which 
this paper attempts to answer then is how the courts have used the principles of 
substance over form and fraus legis to combat tax avoidance which is inconsistent 
with the Income Tax Act’s8 purpose? The purpose of answering this question is to 
provide a principled historical account of the above principles’ development in our 
law as means of combatting impermissible tax avoidance in order to highlight 
potential weaknesses that the simulated transactions doctrine might have as a 
mechanism for curbing impermissible tax avoidance, the role it has played, and 
might continue to play, in combatting such abusive arrangements and to provide a 
principled foundation from which any further development of the doctrine might 
5 SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the Income Tax Act , 1962 (Act No. 58 of 
1962) (2005) pg. 4 
6 Benjamin T Kujinga ‘Factors that Limit the Efficacy of General Anti-Avoidance Rule in Income Tax Legislation: 
Lessons from South Africa, Australia and Canada’ (2014) Comparative and International Law Journal of 
South Africa vol 47 pp. 429 - 430 
7 ibid 
8 Act no. 58 of 1962, as amended. 
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proceed should same be necessary. The above question will be answered by way 
of a historical and doctrinal analysis and discussion of selected influential cases 
which exemplify the use of the plus valet and fraus legis principles and their 
development within the case law as a means of combatting impermissible tax 
avoidance.   
In answering the above question this paper must necessarily limit attention on 
certain aspects of tax avoidance and substance over form generally in order to 
provide a more focussed enquiry. As such, due to the limitations of this paper, 
discussion of the General Anti-Avoidance Rules contained in contained in ss 80A – 
L in the Income Tax Act in any great detail, merely as a comparator for the 
simulated transactions doctrine. Similarly, discussion of the simulated transactions 
doctrine, the plus valet and fraus legis principles is focused to their use in cases of 
tax avoidance with limited discussion of their broader application in the common law 
merely as a means of providing the foundations for the development of these 
principles in a tax law setting and where same is necessary to understand the 
discussion of the tax avoidance case law.  
Chapter 2 begins the enquiry by discussing the genesis of the plus valet and fraus 
legis principles in our law by providing a brief discussion regarding their origins in 
Roman and the writings of the later civil law by drawing primarily on the scholarship 
of Blecher9 as well as the seminal work of Prof. Zimmerman10 before moving on to 
the reception of these principles in our law in the cases of Zandberg v Van Zyl11 and 
Dadoo Ltd and others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council.12 These cases were 
chosen as they were the first cases to authoritatively discuss and lay down the 
principles of plus valet and in fraudem legis in the cases of Zandberg and Dadoo 
respectively. The chapter aims to provide a succinct critical analysis of the courts’ 
treatment and discussion of the principles in these cases before discussing the 
case of Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles Brothers & Hudson 
Ltd13where the plus valet and fraus legis principles were authoritatively discussed 
and applied to a tax avoidance arrangement, the differences in approach and 
9 M D Blecher, Simulated Transactions in the Later Civil Law, 91 S. African L.J. 358 (1974) 
10 Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 
11 1910 AD 302 
12 [1920] AD 530 
13 [1941] 33 SATC 48 
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tensions between the minority judgment of De Wet CJ and the majority judgment of 
Watermeyer JA will be highlighted and the repercussions for the further 
development of these principles as potential anti-avoidance rules will also be 
discussed.  
Chapter 3 then moves the inquiry along to the discussion of the modern approach 
toward the use of these principles as anti-avoidance rules as exemplified in the 
cases of Erf 3183 /1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and Another v CIR,14 and CSARS v NWK 
Ltd.15 The cases of Erf 3183 /1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and Another v CIR will be 
discussed and analysed for its lucid and authoritative exposition of the principles of 
plus valet and fraus legis as well as their example of the courts’ resolution of the 
tensions between the different approaches highlighted in Chapter 2. However, 
focus in this chapter will be given to the case of CSARS v NWK Ltd which has 
dominated the discussion surrounding simulated transactions in recent years. The 
chapter looks to discuss and analyse the approach of the court to the extant case 
law on the matter and critically evaluate the findings of the court that the doctrine is 
in need of development, this discussion will be highlighted and supplemented 
where necessary with reference to the literature surrounding this case to determine 
whether given the findings in chapter 2 and in light of the courts’ determinations in 
Ladysmith and whether the court was correct in its finding that the doctrine requires 
development and whether the development proposed by the court is adequate in 
the circumstances and jurisprudentially sound.    
Chapter 4 Then looks to discuss how the principles laid down in NWK Ltd. have 
been accepted by our courts. In this regard the cases of Roshcon v Anchor Auto 
Body Builders,16  CSARS v Bosch and Another17 and Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd v 
CSARS.18 are discussed. As with the previous chapters this chapter will look to 
analyse the reasoning of the courts in these cases and discuss whether the courts 
have adequately resolved the issues raised with the NWK Ltd judgment potential 
reasons for the courts’ reversal with respect to the development of the simulated 
14 1996 (3) SA 942 (SCA) 
15 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v NWK Ltd 2011 (2) SA 67 (SCA) 
16 [2014] 2 All SA 654 (SCA) 
17  [2015] 1 All SA 1 (SCA)  
18 [2019] 1 All SA 106 (SCA) 
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transactions doctrine will be discussed and lastly an evaluation of the doctrine of 
simulated transactions as a means of curbing impermissible tax avoidance will be 
given to determine the potential for future development of this common law 
mechanism, should it be seen as necessary.  
6 
CHAPTER 2: ORIGINS OF THE SIMULATED TRANSACTIONS DOCTRINE 
Whilst rudimentary definitions for the substance over form principle, encapsulated in 
the maxim plus valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur, and the fraus legis 
principle were provided above they create yet more questions to be answered: 
when is a court empowered to regard the substance of a transaction and disregard 
the contractual form? If the fraus legis principle is part of our law when can a law 
ever be avoided, if at all? How are these principles to be used to mitigate against 
impermissible tax avoidance? To answer these questions this chapter looks to 
discuss the origins of these principles and their reception into our law. As such, the 
origins of the principles in Roman law and their development in the writings of later 
civil law scholars will be used as a point of departure for the critical analysis of the 
reasoning employed in the cases of Zandberg v Van Zyl19 and Dadoo Ltd and 
others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council,20 each regarded as the locus classicus for 
the substance over form principle and the fraus legis principle respectively.21 
Further, the reception and development of these principles in a tax law framework 
will be analysed through a discussion of the Commissioner of Customs and Excise 
v Randles Brothers & Hudson Ltd22 case in order to provide a fuller and more 
robust definition of these principles and to highlight coincidence, thus creating the 
simulated transactions doctrine. These cases have been selected as the 
archetypes for the principles of plus valet, fraudem legis and simulated transactions 
respectively as they were the first cases in our law to authoritatively state the scope 
and content of each principle and are still used as authority today, thus how we 
understand the ratio of these cases is crucial to the understanding of the use of 
simulated transactions today. Whilst, “The enquiry, therefore, is in each case one of 
fact, for the right solution of which no general rule can be laid down”23  the 
application of the principles to the facts in each case will be discussed as a means 
through which greater understanding can be given as to how the differing 
approaches would affect their application going forward The chapter then concludes 
19 1910 AD 302 
20 [1920] AD 530 
21 Hutchison, A & Hutchison, D “Simulated Transactions and the Fraus Legis Doctrine” 131 South African Law 
Journal 69 (2014) 
22 [1941] 33 SATC 48 
23 Zandberg v Van Zyl 1910 AD 302 at 309 
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with an evaluation and analysis of the principles laid out in the above case law and 
their continued relevance in our modern jurisprudence.   
The practice of simulated transactions was not unknown in Roman Law, although 
they did not have a developed theory describing simulated transactions but rather a 
collection of laws describing discreet acts of simulation and the consequences 
thereof.24 That said a generalised theory of simulation began to emerge from the 
rescripts of the codex, the most important of which were those collected under the 
rubric of plus valere quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur which formed the 
basis of the later medieval writings on the subject of simulation although in the time 
of Justinian this did not denote purely simulated contracts but may also have 
applied to nude contracts as well.25 Similarly, the Romans did not have a developed 
general rule with regards to transactions in fraudem legis, special clauses would 
have to be added prohibiting the doing of anything that might defeat the objects of 
the law in question.26 The two concepts were juridically distinct in Roman times; the 
rubric of plus valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur not being directly 
concerned with fraus legis but rather the divergence between the appearance and 
the reality of things irrespective of whether they may have been undertaken to 
circumvent an law.27 Nevertheless the two concepts had become somewhat 
intertwined through the writings of the Glossators who had developed the same 
criteria for the determination of both transactions in fraudem legis and transactions 
the application of the plus valet maxim, although theoretically the two principles 
were still distinct – transactions in fraudem legis involving an actus verus which 
simulated transactions did not.28 Transactions in fraudem legis being truly intended 
by the parties in order to circumvent the law whereas simulated transactions were 
not intended to be effective by the parties but merely to cloak the underling 
transaction. Secondly, simulated transactions were regarded as bilateral acts by the 
civil law scholars whereas fraus could potentially be committed unilaterally29. 
Thirdly, simulated contracts were void for lack of consensus whereas contracts in 
fraudem legis may nevertheless remain valid, concerned as the principle was with 
24 Ibid note 9 at pp 358 - 359 
25 Ibid at 360 
26 Ibid  
27 Ibid 362 
28 Ibid 2 at pp 648 - 649 
29 Ibid 9 at 368 
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statutory interpretation rather than the mental state of the transactor(s).30 The 
confusion between transactions in fraudem legis and simulated transactions in the 
writings of the medieval scholars might be attributed to their attempts to determine 
how the courts might determine the true state of affairs in a simulated transaction; 
thus the attempts to classify simulated transactions by subject matter, as where a 
loan of grain is really intended as a loan of money; by contract type, as where a 
sale disguises a loan; or where a contract between A and B is used to disguise the 
actual contract between A and C, where B cannot validly be substituted for C in 
each situation the contract may be simulated, in fraudem legis or both31. Thus the 
writings of the later civil law jurists show the vexed nature of providing a coherent 
theory with regards to simulated transactions distinct from that of fraus legis 
however it is nevertheless clear from their writings that simulation is primarily a 
defect of the intentions of the parties and simulated transactions were thus void for 
lack of consensus, which, as will be shown below, affected how our law received 
and understood the substance over form and fraus legis principles.   
The earliest authoritative judicial pronouncement on the substance over form 
principle, its origins, ambit and meaning  comes from the case of Zandberg v Van 
Zyl32 which remains the locus classicus on the subject to this day. The dispute in 
question centred on the possession of a wagon and whether same had been validly 
sold. A brief synopsis of the facts as well as the reasoning of some of the judges 
follows below.  
The question to be determined in the case was whether the wagon in question 
could be validly attached by the Magistrate’s court in satisfaction of a debt owed by 
the respondent’s mother-in-law to the Appellant. The Respondent had argued that 
the wagon in question was validly sold to him by his mother-in-law in satisfaction of 
a prior debt that she had owed him, accordingly the wagon was his property and not 
Mrs. Van Zyl’s and therefore could not be attached. The Appellant had argued that 
the transaction as between the Respondent and his mother-in-law was not in 
substance a sale but a pledge, accordingly as he had relinquished possession of 
the wagon same could be attached in satisfaction of the debt. The court had to 
30 Ibid  
31 Ibid note 9 at pp 363 - 369 
32 Ibid note11 
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decide therefore whether the sale in question was a genuine transaction or if it 
merely disguised a pledge.  The court found unanimously in favour of the Appellant 
that the transaction was truly a pledge. The focus of this analysis will be given to 
Innes J’s judgment as his treatment of the plus valet maxim and substance over 
form principle are largely viewed as the authoritative statement thereof, Solomon J 
deciding the matter on similar reasons and De Villiers CJ deciding the matter 
entirely different grounds, Innes J remains the most apposite judgment for the 
purposes of this analysis.  
Innes J decided the matter on the basis of the plus valet maxim where he held, the 
now authoritative view on the plus valet maxim, as follows: 
“Now, as a general rule, the parties to a contract express themselves in 
language calculated without subterfuge or concealment to embody the 
agreement at which they have arrived. They intend the contract to be 
exactly what it purports; and the shape which it assumes is what they 
meant it should have. Not infrequently, however (either to secure some 
advantage which otherwise the law would not give, or to escape some 
disability which otherwise the law would impose), the parties to a 
transaction endeavour to conceal its real character. They call it by a 
name, or give it a shape, intended not to express but to disguise its true 
nature. And when a Court is asked to decide any rights under such an 
agreement, it can only do so by giving effect to what the transaction really 
is; not what in form it purports to be. The maxim then applies plus valet 
quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur. But the words of the rule 
indicate its limitations. The Court must be satisfied that there is a real 
intention, definitely ascertainable, which differs from the simulated 
intention. For if the parties in fact mean that a contract shall have effect in 
accordance with its tenor, the circumstances that the same object might 
have been attained in another way will not necessarily make the 
arrangement other than it purports to be. The inquiry, therefore, is in each 
case one of fact, for the right solution of which no general rule can be laid 
down.”33 
33 ibid at pg 309 
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Thus, for Innes J a court is justified in disregarding the contract where it is satisfied 
that a definitely ascertainable real intention of the parties which differs from the 
purported intention to contract on the terms alleged by the parties. Thus only when 
the court is satisfied that there is an ulterior intention can the court disregard the 
ostensible agreement, importantly merely concluding that the agreement could 
have been done in some other way is not enough, it must be shown that the parties 
did not intend the agreement to have effect according to its tenor.  
Turning to the facts before the Court Innes J came to the conclusion that the 
substance of the transaction was that of a pledge and not a sale. This conclusion 
was supported by the fact that it was a condition of the agreement between Mrs. 
Van Zyl and the Respondent that she might repurchase the wagon at any time, 
further that Mrs. Van Zyl could use the wagon at any time and for any length of time 
that she wanted. These facts taken together “so operated upon the respondent's 
legal position as to make it well-nigh impossible to believe that he really thought 
that he was acquiring the ownership of this wagon. A man buys an article --- even 
though he takes it over in satisfaction of a debt --- because he wishes it to belong to 
him, so that his interests may be thereby advanced. But the respondent… did not in 
fact, and could not in law, exercise the ordinary rights of an owner”34 Further, when 
these facts were considered in the context of the debt that Mrs. Van Zyl owed the 
respondent, the exact amount of the alleged sale, the balance of probabilities would 
have indicated that the parties did not intend a sale but rather to secure the debt 
owed by Mrs. Van Zyl in the form of a sale.35 These facts lead the Justice to the 
conclusion that the real object of the parties was not to that the respondent would 
acquire the wagon but rather that his debt was secured by the sale should other 
creditors collected their debts, as such the real contract was one of pledge not sale 
as such the cancellation of the debt by the endorsement on the acknowledgement 
thereof was thus merely a formality undertaken to conceal the true character of the 
transaction.36 That Mrs. Van Zyl was unlikely to ever make good on the debt and 
that the parties were taken to have known that the contract of sale would not stand 
up to scrutiny if the debt remained undischarged were sufficient to answer the 
34 Ibid at 312 
35 Ibid at 311 
36 Ibid at 312 - 313 
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counterargument that if the contract was a pledge then the parties would not have 
discharged the debt. 
At this point one might wonder if the reasoning employed by Innes J as regards the 
facts of this case is sound, surely if the contract was found to be that of a pledge 
rather than a sale because the respondent did not have the requisite animus 
emendi , a requirement for a contract of sale,37 then equally it may be asked how 
the court could conclude that a pledge had been established where the respondent 
surrendered possession as extensively as he did, coupled with the fact that the 
respondent discharged the debt suggests just as much that the parties did not have 
the real intention of concluding a pledge as the lack of animus emendi suggests 
that the parties did not likely intend a sale. Put differently, the fact that the 
Respondent so extensively gave up possession of the pledged item and also 
seemingly discharged the debt do no support a finding that the parties must have 
intended a pledge. Whilst it was inferred by the court that the debtor’s dire financial 
situation meant that she would never repay the debt and thus it was of no moment 
to the Respondent to discharge it, that this was merely part of the simulated form of 
the agreement; however, the debtors financial predicament, that she would in all 
likelihood never be able to repay the debt is surely evidence of the fact that the 
parties must have then intended a sale, otherwise one must conclude that the 
respondent risked ever recouping his financial outlay in  order to appear as if he 
had secured it. Whilst it must be admitted this analysis is undertaken over a century 
later, and without the aid of the admittedly meagre evidence, this cannot be the 
more reasonable inference available to the court. Further complicating the 
reasoning of Innes J,  he did not “apply any harsh word to the transaction…[merely 
saying that] it was in essence not a sale, but at most a pledge, and that the Court is 
bound to deal with it according to its substance, and not according to its form.”38 
Accordingly, at the least Innes J did not feel it necessary to determine or comment 
on the nature of the simulated intention and possibly felt that the simulation was 
undertaken by the parties in innocence. What then can be taken away from this 
case? This case can be, and it has been, cited as authority for the principle that 
37  K Lermen ‘’Sale’’ in  Francios du Bois (general ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) Juta 
cites Zandberg as authority for the fact that where animus emendi is lacking the transaction in question may 
well be a pledge 
38 Ibid note 11 at pg. 313 
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where the transaction ostensibly intended by the parties is at odds with what the 
court determines is the real intention of the parties then court is empowered by the 
plus valet maxim to disregard the form of the transaction. However, how the court is 
to determine what the transaction really is between the parties is nevertheless 
vexed, the only guidance given by the court being that same object may have been 
achieved differently is not reason enough to conclude that it was simulated. On the 
one hand the reasoning of the court could be understood to be that a court is bound 
to give effect to the agreement that the facts support the existence of, in this case 
that the facts supposedly supported an inference that the parties did not intend the 
ostensible sale but rather the inference of a pledge, this view is problematic for the 
reasons given above. Alternatively, one may say that the court should view a 
transaction as simulated where the objective effects of the transaction do not 
support the conclusion that the parties intended the ostensible transaction to have: 
so, that the supposed contract had the effect of so depriving the respondent of 
almost all the rights of owner was inconsistent with the object of a contract of sale. 
Thus, it seems that the introduction of the plus valet principle in our law was just as 
confused as its early development was in the old authorities, a confusion that has it 
seems continued in the development of the simulated transactions doctrine as the 
next case to be analysed shows.  
The next case in the development of the simulated transactions doctrine after 
Zandberg v Van Zyl was Dadoo Ltd and others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council.39 
Briefly stated the case centred on whether a person prohibited from owning land in 
our more racist past could nevertheless avoid the legislation through the 
incorporation of a company. This case was a significant development not only for 
the simulated transactions doctrine but also the fraus legis principle specifically, to 
briefly recall the discussion earlier whilst early writers on this subject frequently 
tangled  the concepts of fraus legis and plus valet in their discussions of these 
concepts they nevertheless remained distinct concepts, at least theoretically, this 
case then was one of the first in our law to authoritatively discuss the two concepts 
and lay the foundations in our law for the future treatment thereof.   
39 Ibid footnote 12 
13 
 
To place the case in context, the law at the time prohibited certain classes of people 
from owning land in the Krugersdorp municipality, amongst them people of ‘Asiatic’ 
decent. One of the Appellants, Mr Dadoo, incorporated a company, Dadoo Ltd, with 
a share capital of 150 shares of which he owned 149, the objects of the company 
were inter alia the acquisition of, and trafficking in, land and any further business to 
take place on the land. The company then purchased two plots of land within the 
municipality, the one being leased by the company to Mr Dadoo and the other being 
used for Mr Dadoo’s residence. The Respondents then instituted action against the 
company, Mr Dadoo and another on the grounds that the transfers of the land in 
question were contrary to the purpose of the law and therefore in fraudem legis. 
The Transvaal Provincial Division, per Wessels J, granted an order in favour of the 
respondent setting aside the transfer of the land, which finding was then appealed 
in this case. Three judgements were written Solomon J.A for the majority, with 
Innes CJ writing a separate concurring judgment and De Villiers JA writing a 
minority judgment, all judgments centred on nature, scope and limitations of the 
fraus legis principle.    
Both40 Innes CJ and Solomon J questioned whether the fraus legis principle 
allowed a court to prohibit any actions or transactions which “did violence to [the 
law’s] spirit and intent”41 which would then, they reasoned allow a court to legislate 
by supplementing perceived omissions in the law. Both Innes CJ and Solomon JA 
held that our courts have not claimed such an authority to extend legislation beyond 
the meaning of the words and thereby, they both reason, legislate.42  
 
Solomon JA held that: 
“…where a statute prohibits anything being done, the law cannot be 
circumvented by the doing of at act in an indirect manner. These rules, 
indeed, are, in my opinion, merely an application of a general principle, 
which is as much a part of English as of Roman Jurisprudence, that courts 
should have regard to the substance rather than to the form of a 
 
40 Per Innes CJ at 543 - 544 and per Solomon J at 558 
41 at 558 
42 ibid note 40 
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transaction, and should strip off any disguise which is intended to conceal 
its real nature. "Plus valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur."”43 
[own emphasis added] 
Similarly, for Innes JA: 
“An examination of the authorities therefore leads me to the conclusion 
that a transaction is in fraudem legis when it is designedly disguised so as 
to escape the provisions of the law, but falls in truth - within these 
provisions. Thus stated, the rule is merely a branch of the fundamental 
doctrine that the law regards the substance rather than the form of things, 
--- a doctrine common, one would think, to every system of jurisprudence 
and conveniently expressed in the maxim plus valet quod agitur quam 
quod simulate concipitur…. But an Act thus construed may nevertheless 
be evaded; parties may genuinely arrange their transactions so as to 
remain outside its provisions. Such a procedure is, in the nature of things, 
perfectly legitimate. There is nothing in the authorities, as I understand 
them, to forbid it. Nor can it be rendered illegitimate by the mere fact that 
the parties intend to avoid the operation of the law, and that the selected 
course is as convenient in its result as another which would have brought 
them within it. An attempted evasion, however, may proceed on other 
lines. The transaction contemplated may in truth be within the provisions of 
the statute, but the parties may call it by a name or cloak it in a guise, 
calculated to escape these provisions. Such a transaction would be in 
fraudem legis; the Court would strip off its form and disclose its real 
nature, and the law would operate… And if that be so, then there is no 
practical difference between our rule on this point and the rule of English 
law. Under both systems the words of the lawgiver must be read in the 
light of his intention to be gathered from the enactment as a whole and 
from a consideration of the mischief dealt with. Voet (ad Pand. 1.3, par. 
20) states this very clearly. That interpretation should be adopted, he says,
which is most calculated to attain the object and most in accordance with 
the mind of the lawgiver; not a hide-bound interpretation nor one which 
43 Ibid note 12 at 558 
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circumvents the aim of the law so as to allow that which the law does not 
wish to be done, though it has not expressly prohibited it. But he 
emphasises the importance of adhering to the language of the statute 
where there is any doubt… But an Act thus construed may nevertheless 
be evaded; parties may genuinely arrange their transactions so as to 
remain outside its provisions. Such a procedure is, in the nature of things, 
perfectly legitimate. There is nothing in the authorities, as I understand 
them, to forbid it… An attempted evasion, however, may l proceed on 
other lines. The transaction contemplated may in truth be within the 
provisions of the statute, but the parties may call it by a name or cloak it in 
a guise, calculated to escape those provisions. Such a transaction would 
be in fraudem legis; the Court would strip off its form and disclose its real 
nature, and the law would operate.”44 [own emphasis added] 
 
For De Villiers JA, the answer to when a transaction was said to be in fraudem legis 
was to be answered with reference to the intention of parliament, so before 
determining that the transaction contravenes the law the intention behind the law of 
the legislature would need to first be determined.45 Another difference between the 
other two judgments and that of De Villiers JA was that he clearly distinguished 
between simulated transactions and transactions in fraudem legis, noting that whilst 
simulated transactions were the means usually employed in avoiding the law they 
were not the only means, and whilst all simulated transactions were in fraudem 
legis not all transactions in fraudem legis were simulated transactions.46 De Villiers 
rejects the claim that this construction of the fraus legis doctrine violates the 
cannons of construction on the basis that the fraus legis principle is a part of our 
law to which the cannons of construction are secondary.47 
Applying the law to the facts of the case both Innes CJ48 and Solomon JA49 
reasoned that the answer to whether the transfer of the land in question to Dadoo 
Ltd was in fraudem legis turned on whether the company was validly incorporated 
 
44 Ibid at 547- 548  
45 Ibid at pp 564 - 565 
46 Ibid at pp 567 – 568  
47 Ibid at pg 571 
48 Ibid at 548 - 553 
49 Ibid at pg 560 - 562 
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or if it was merely a simulation designed to escape the provisions of the law. Given 
that the company was duly incorporated and that there was no evidence before the 
court that the incorporation was a sham as such it could not be found to be in fraud 
of the law. Further, neither Innes CJ nor Solomon JA could find justification in 
extending the interpretation of the statute beyond the ordinary scope of the words 
used because there was nothing to indicate that this scenario occurred to the mind 
of the legislature, likewise even if such an interpretation were indicated it would not 
be without difficulty. 
De Villiers JA likened the imposition of a company in order to purchase land in 
question as similar in effect to the use of an agent to purchase land, accordingly if 
the use of an agent to effect one’s purpose was barred then the use of a company 
was similarly barred.50 Thus, for De Villiers JA the law in question extended beyond 
its wording to consider the legislative intent; of further interest is the clearly 
objective approach to determining the legislation and transaction under review: 
namely that given the effect it had the legal form of the company should be 
disregarded and the transaction should be analysed in terms of its purpose, namely 
to give control of the land to the incorporators further that the legislation should be 
interpreted in terms of the purpose of its enactment, interestingly De Villiers JA 
does not address the concern raised by Solomon and  Innes JJA that by extending 
the legislation beyond the words used in effect would be legislating on behalf of 
parliament. 
The majority judgment in Dadoo Ltd and others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 
thus established in our law that a person is at liberty to avoid the application of a 
statute by deliberately arranging their affairs so as to remain outside of the statute’s 
ambit. The majority of the court clearly favouring a reading of the fraus legis 
principle as only applicable to fraudulently disguised transactions, which by virtue of 
the fraudulent disguise avoid the law’s application, the minority view holding that 
any transaction, simulated or not, which is contrary to the deemed intention of the 
50 Ibid At 570 
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legislature would be in fraudem legis.51 As noted earlier the principle of fraus legis 
was a means of interpreting statutes, in order to determine whether the statute in 
question had application beyond the literal meaning of the words used.52 Thus, to 
reiterate Roman Law distinguished between the meaning of the words of the statute 
( the verba legis) and the meaning of the statute itself ( the sententia legis) and 
where the two were found to not be coextensive, the real meaning of the statute 
(sententia legis) would be given effect, thus fraus legis was used as an empowering 
law to allow courts to investigate the meaning of the statute and the facts of the 
case to see if the former was applicable to the latter, the parties intentions were 
thus not relevant to the inquiry.53 The majority judgments clearly indicate a shift 
away from this understanding of fraus legis viewing the principle as applicable to 
the correct nature of the transaction under review , whether this judgment is 
authority for the view that the underlying statutory purpose or the intention of the 
legislature cannot be used to determine whether a transaction is in fraudem legis is 
debatable,54 however what is clear is that the majority judgment nevertheless views 
the transactional intention as integral to the application of the fraus legis principle. 
Accordingly, the disguised intentions of the parties becoming a necessary 
precondition of the application of the fraus legis principle, that is the finding of a 
simulated intention on the part of the transactors is the defining feature of the 
transaction being in fraudem legis. Thus where Zandberg v Van Zyl may have 
inadvertently conflated the plus valet principle with that of fraus legis in determining 
how the simulated transaction is to be evaluated, the majority in Dadoo ltd and 
Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council appears to expressly conflate the two 
principles in their rejection of the reading of fraus legis as allowing the court to go 
beyond the wording of a statute to determine its application and reading the 
application of the principle as necessarily involving a simulated transaction, which 
transaction is ostensibly entered into in order to avoid the application of the statute, 
on the part of the transactors. This case then raises further questions regarding 
simulated transactions, what may be said to be the limits of a statutes application, 
whilst the majority held that courts may not use the principle of fraus legis as a 
51 Hutchison, A & Hutchison, D “Simulated Transactions and the Fraus Legis Doctrine” 131 South African Law 
Journal 69 (2014) at pg. 73 
52 MD Blecher, ibid note 9 
53 Anton G. Derksen, To What Extent Does the Common Law Allow the Avoidance of Statutes - A Discussion in 
Which Specific Reference Is Made to Tax Statutes, 112 S.African L.J. 88 (1995) at pp 94 - 95 
54 Ibid at 97 
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means of supplementing perceived omissions in the legislation it was conceded that 
the court may have recourse to the statutory purpose, to what end the statutory 
purpose may then be used to extend the meaning of the words of the legislation 
beyond the literal denotative meaning remains in question. Further, both this case 
and Zandberg v Van Zyl leave open the question as to how the court is to 
determine that a transaction is simulated, as noted above Zandberg v Van Zyl did 
not properly determine that there was some other real intention which was definitely 
ascertainable, but decided the case on the grounds that the parties to the 
transaction could not have intended the ostensible transaction seemingly based on 
the effects of the transaction; likewise,  the majority in in Dadoo ltd and Others v 
Krugersdorp Municipal Council do not explain what is meant by a simulated 
transaction other than to say that it is not the real intention of the parties, the 
minority judgment holding that ultimately the parties’ intention was not relevant for 
the application of fraus legis, but rather the intention of parliament.  
 
The cases of Zandberg v Van Zyl and Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp 
Municipal Council and an attempted answer to the questions posed above were 
addressed in the case of the Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles 
Brothers & Hudson Ltd55 which is discussed below. 
 
The Respondents in this case were importers of material into the Republic which 
were then given to manufacturers under a contract of services to be manufactured 
into various garments. The Respondents had previously enjoyed a rebate on 
customs duties for the importation of said material. The regulations allowing for the 
rebate were changed in 1936 and required the manufacturers to declare the 
imported property as their own in order for the rebate to be applicable. The 
Respondent then changed their ordinary procedures and now purported to sell the 
materials to the manufacturers, in order to comply with the new regulations which 
required the manufacturers to declare inter alia that the goods were their own 
property, the manufacturers would then resell the manufactured goods back to the 
Respondents at the same price for which the materials were bought plus the agreed 
cost of manufacturing the items of clothing. Commissioner argued that 
 
55 [1941] AD 369 
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notwithstanding the new contractual arrangement the Respondents remained at all 
times the owner of the material and therefore the rebates for the period under 
review should be disallowed. Accordingly, the case centred on whether the 
transactions should be set aside as being in fraudem legis. There were four  
judgments given by the court however, for the purposes of this discussion the 
analysis will focus on the majority judgment of Watermeyer JA and the minority 
judgment of De Wet CJ given the focus of the judgments on the nature and 
application of the plus valet and fraus legis principles and how these judgments 
exemplify the tension in understanding these principles alluded to in the cases 
above. 
Watermeyer JA, writing for the majority, held: 
“When a statute forbids or taxes a certain transaction, defined by name or 
description, and the question arises whether a particular transaction falls 
within or without the prohibition or tax, two problems of interpretation or 
construction always arises. Firstly, the law has to be construed to 
ascertain what kind of transaction is forbidden or taxed, and secondly the 
transaction has to be interpreted to ascertain whether it is a transaction of 
the kind which is forbidden or taxed…[referring to the judgment of Innes J 
in Zandberg v Van Zyl, Watermeyer JA held] I wish to draw particular 
attention to the words ‘a real intention, definitely ascertainable, which 
differs from the simulated intention’, because they indicate clearly what 
the learned judge meant by a ‘disguised’ transaction. A transaction is not 
necessarily a disguised one because it is devised for the purpose of 
evading the prohibition in the Act or avoiding liability for the tax imposed 
by it. A transaction devised for that purpose, if the parties honestly intend 
it to have effect according to its tenor, is interpreted by the courts 
according to its tenor, and then the only question is whether, so 
interpreted, it falls within or without the prohibition or tax. 
A disguised transaction in the sense in which the words are used above 
is something different. In essence it is a dishonest transaction: dishonest, 
in as much as the parties to it do not really intend it to have, inter partes, 
the legal effect which its terms convey to the outside world. The purpose 
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of the disguise is to deceive by concealing what is the real agreement or 
transaction between the parties. The parties wish to hide the fact that 
their real agreement or transaction falls within the prohibition or is subject 
to the tax, and so they dress it up in a guise which conveys the 
impression that it is outside of the prohibition or not subject to the tax. 
Such a transaction is said to be in fraudem legis, and is interpreted by the 
courts in accordance with what is found to be the real agreement or 
transaction between the parties. 
Of course, before the court can find that a transaction is in fraudem legis 
in the above sense, it must be satisfied that there is some unexpressed 
agreement or tacit understanding between the parties. If this were not so, 
it could not find that the ostensible agreement is a pretence. The blurring 
of this distinction between an honest transaction devised to avoid the 
provisions of a statute and a transaction falling within the prohibitory or 
taxing provisions of a statute but disguised to make it appear as if it does 
not, gives rise to much of the confusion which sometimes appears to 
accompany attempts to apply the maxim quoted above.”56 
Contrastingly, in the view of De Wet CJ 
“…the plaintiff contends that the Court must enquire into the real nature of 
the transaction and discover whether there is a real intention definitely 
ascertainable which differs from the simulated intention, irrespective of 
what the parties say the transaction is, and must give to the transaction 
the legal effects which the law gives it no matter what the parties intend. I 
think the last part of this proposition is too widely stated: the Court must 
give effect to the transaction according to what it finds to be the real 
intention of the parties…[noting the dicta of Innes J in Zandberg v Van Zyl 
quoted above].. I do not think they meant to lay down that the question 
whether the apparent intention was real or simulated must be determined 
by what the parties, however honestly, stated to be their intention and not 
from the real nature of the transaction as found by the Court. This view is 
56 Ibid note 13 at 395 to 396 
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borne out by the subsequent case of McAdams v Fiander's Trustee57 
[quoting De Villiers JA at p 223]… I think the learned Judge intended to 
emphasise in the last sentence that, if the Court on a consideration of all 
the circumstances comes to the conclusion that the transaction was in fact 
not what it purported to be, it follows that however honestly the parties 
thought that their intention was in accord with the simulated transaction, 
that was not their real intention.”58 
 
Thus stated the tensions implicit within the judgments of Zandberg v Van Zyl and 
Dadoo Ltd and others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council are now explicitly brought to 
the fore. The distinction between the judgements here is that, for De Wet CJ, for a 
transaction to be simulated the substance of the agreement must be different from 
its form, irrespective of what the parties intended; whereas Watermeyer JA finds 
that not only must the substance not match the form of the agreement but in 
addition to this objective determination it must be determined that both parties 
intended, and therefore agree, that the substance of the transaction will not match 
its form.  
 
Of further interest, Watermeyer JA distinguishes 3 separate steps to be undertaken 
when evaluating a transaction under the plus valet or fraus legis principles: firstly, 
the legislation should be interpreted in order to ascertain its meaning and scope;59 
Secondly, after having ascertained the nature and scope of the legislation, the 
transaction itself must be evaluated in order to ascertain its true nature: the court 
must then determine whether the facts firstly support the purported transaction by 
the parties, and, if not, whether the facts before the court establish a tacit 
agreement as between the parties that not only that the purported agreement would 
not be effective inter partes but also that some other agreement would be effective 
between them; Thirdly, having established some hidden tacit agreement between 
the parties it remains for the court to determine whether the law, as interpreted, 
would be applicable to the true transaction, as interpreted.  
 
 
57 1919 AD 207 
58 Ibid at pp 381 - 383 
59 ibid At pg 394 
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Contrastingly, De Wet CJ appears to approve of a more objective approach to 
determining whether a transaction is simulated, from the above quotation it appears 
that De Wet CJ holds a transaction to be simulated where the real intention as 
found by the court is found to differ from the apparently intended transaction. It is 
clear from the Honourable Justice’s dicta noted above that the transaction must be 
in accordance with what the court holds the transaction to be irrespective of what 
the parties actually intended, and where the court is of the view that the parties 
could not have intended a particular transaction, given the necessary inferences to 
be drawn from the available evidence then the court should declare the ostensible 
transaction simulated. To illustrate this point, if we are to apply this dicta to the facts 
of Zandberg v Van Zyl: on an evaluation of the evidence the court must conclude 
that irrespective of the parties intentions, the necessary inference from the stated 
facts is that the ostensible transaction before the court was not one of sale, given 
that the purchaser/Respondent gave up so many rights to the purchased item and 
so extensively, that the court must conclude that the parties did not intend a sale, it 
being inimical to the objective understanding as to what a sale entails. Likewise, if 
we are to apply the reasoning of De Wet CJ to the case of Dadoo Ltd and Others v 
Krugersdorp Municipal Council the outcome would largely be the same as 
determined by the majority in that case: that the company in question purchased 
land and held same in its own name is in keeping with the objectively determinable 
nature of a company – that it has separate legal personality from its incorporators.  
 
In application of the rules applicable to the facts, as determined by the Honourable 
Justices, Watermeyer JA held that the transaction in question was not simulated 
whereas De Wet CJ held that it was. De Wet CJ held that in using the words “my 
own property” in the regulations under review, the intention of the legislature was 
that beneficial ownership would have to pass to the manufacturer.60 Secondly, 
when the unusual features of the purported contract of sale: that the price was 
arbitrarily fixed by the Respondent and of no difference to the manufacturers, that 
no risk in bearing the loss of destruction of the merx passed to the manufacturers 
were measured against the practical effect of the agreement, that the 
manufacturers debarred themselves from enjoying the essential benefits of 
 
60 Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles Brothers & Hudson Ltd at pg 380 
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ownership. In the circumstances the practical effect of the agreement   and unusual 
terms of the contract were inconsistent with what the judge viewed as the legal 
features and effect of a contract of sale. 
In contrast to the judgment of De Wet CJ, Watermeyer JA, assumed that the 
regulations in question required that ownership must pass from importer to 
manufacturer.61 Further, where the law referred to ownership it was not open to the 
court to extend the meaning of the term “my own property” to mean "my own 
property untrammelled by any contractual obligations to manufacture the articles 
into specified garments and sell them to the importer after they have been 
manufactured."62As such whether the contract was one of locatio operis or sale was 
not dispositive of the issue, neither being inconsistent with the transfer of ownership 
(the means by which the parties could escape the taxing provision). However, the 
form of the contract could be a factor from which the intention to transfer ownership 
could be inferred.63 In reviewing the transaction before the court, ostensibly one of 
sale the judge held that the genuineness of the contract could not be determined 
with reference to its form but that also the evidence showed that the parties had 
consensus as to the essentialia of the contract, the merx and the pretium and that 
the unusual features of the contract do not alter its essential nature.64 But the 
transaction could be set aside if the transaction could be shown to be a pretence, 
but this was a difficult conclusion to arrive at because, inter alia, parties do not enter 
into a sham contract unless they are dishonest and unless the pretence brings them 
some advantage which they cannot get by entering into a real contract. But “It was 
so much in their interests to have the intention of transferring ownership that it is 
difficult to believe that they did not have it.”65 The key in comparing the unusual 
features of the contract between the parties in the present case and the ostensible 
contract of sale in the case of Zandberg v Van Zyl was that in Zanderg the parties 
dishonestly formed the transaction as a sale and that they never intended the 
contract to have the effect according to its tenor.66 The key determination for 
Watermeyer JA was that in the present case the transaction could only be a 
61 Ibid at 397 
62 Ibid at 401 
63 Ibid at 398 
64 Ibid at 400 
65 Ibid at 403 
66 ibid 
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pretence if the parties did not intend to transfer ownership, which was not the same 
as control; the factors relied on by the commissioner were not inconsistent with the 
intention to transfer ownership. The facts of the case would only prove that the 
transaction was a pretence if they were inconsistent with the view that the parties 
intended the transaction of a transfer of ownership. 
From the outset this chapter looked to analyse the early case law on the principles 
of plus valet and fraus legis in order to provide answers as to when a court is 
empowered to regard the substance of a transaction and disregard the contractual 
form, when may a law be validly avoided and of most importance how the answer to 
these questions provide insight into how the plus valet and fraus legis might be 
used as mechanisms to curb tax avoidance. In answering these questions the 
cases of Zandberg v Van Zyl, Dadoo v Krugersdorp Municipal Council and 
Commissioner for Customs and Excise v Randles, Brothers & Hudson were chosen 
for discussion given their continued relevance in our discussions of these principles, 
these cases still being cited as authorities to this day. From the aforegoing case law 
it may be said that a court is empowered by the plus valet principle to disregard the 
contractual guise of a transaction and apply what is deemed to be the substantive 
transaction where the expressed transaction is determined to be inauthentic. 
Similarly, a court may determine that where a transaction is undertaken in order to 
avoid the application of some law, the law will nevertheless be applicable where it is 
found that the transaction in question was simulated. Accordingly, in a tax 
avoidance context a court will disregard the contractual guise of a transaction when 
it is evident to the court that there exists some underlying tacit agreement between 
the parties that the contractual form of the transaction will have no effect inter 
partes, where this is the case the court will determine what the real transaction 
between the parties is and thereafter interpret the law in order to determine whether 
the law in question can be said to be applicable to the real transaction determined 
by the court.  
Despite the relative simplicity with which these rules may be expressed there is 
nevertheless some difficulty in understanding their application, which difficulty is 
highlighted in the divergent approaches of the majority and minority judgments 
discussed in Commissioner for Customs and Excise v Randles, Brothers & Hudson. 
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The discussion of these two judgments highlights a divergent approach to 
determining the intention of the parties: for the majority the question would be 
answered by determining the correct intention of the parties (to transfer ownership) 
and to determine whether the evidence was consistent with such intention; whereas 
the Minority judgment took the view that the intention of the parties was to be 
determined with reference to the effects of the contract and evaluate them in 
comparison with what may be said to be the expected effects of an ordinary 
contract of sale. Likewise the judgments differed on the correct approach to the 
interpretation of the law in question: Watermeyer JA preferring an approach 
anchored in the words of the regulations whereas De Wet CJ taking a more 
extensive approach in considering the purpose and intent of the regulations, 
reminiscent of the differing approaches in Dadoo Ltd and others v Krugersdorp 
Municipal Council. These issues, far from being merely academic may have very 
real repercussions on whether a complicated transaction, deigned with the purpose 
of avoiding tax, may be said to be simulated, as the case of Commissioner for 
Customs and Excise v Randles, Brothers & Hudson shows. Thus, in order for the 
simulated transactions doctrine to be an effective mechanism to combat tax 
avoidance these discrepancies would need to be addressed.  
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CHAPTER 3: SIMULATION CONSIDERED IN TAX LAW 
Having analysed the case law regarding simulated transactions what is hoped to 
have been made clear is that whilst stated in the abstract the rules relating to plus 
valet and fraus legis may seem simple, the application of these rules appears to be 
more complex; from an evaluation of the case law regarded as authoritative on this 
matter there appears to be two ways in which these maxims have been considered: 
on one hand the case law seems to suggest that the intention of the parties to the 
transaction should be evaluated according to whether the facts in evidence support 
the alleged intentions of the parties; alternatively, as some of the judgments in the 
cases thus far reviewed seem to show, one may view a transaction as simulated 
where the effects of the transaction are inconsistent with the effects of an ordinary 
transaction of the type alleged by the parties. This chapter then looks to review 
selected cases in which these principles, as laid out in the case law from Chapter 1, 
have been applied in a tax avoidance context. The aim then of this chapter is to 
determine whether the issues raised and discussed in Chapter 1 have been 
resolved. Much as in Chapter 2, the cases of  cases of Erf 3183 /1 Ladysmith (Pty) 
Ltd and Another v CIR,67 and CSARS v NWK Ltd.68 have been selected not only 
because they are recent but also for their discussion of previous case law on the 
subject, accordingly the discussion of these cases allows for the succinct 
discussion of the development of the principle of simulated transactions in our law 
more generally as well as allowing for the discussion of the simulated transactions 
doctrine as a means of combatting tax avoidance more broadly. The ultimate aim of 
this chapter is to highlight how the courts have attempted to resolve the issues 
raised in Chapter 2 in developing a more coherent doctrine of simulated 
transactions which may be used to curb tax avoidance. The discussion will proceed 
chronologically by first discussing Erf 3183 /1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and Another v 
CIR and thereafter CSARS v NWK Ltd.  
67 1996 (3) SA 942 (SCA) 
68 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v NWK Ltd 2011 (2) SA 67 (SCA) 
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The case of Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith and Another v CIR69 has long been regarded as 
the authoritative statement of the principle of simulated transactions in respect of 
common-law tax-avoidance mechanisms.70 The facts of the case are discussed 
below. 
 A company called Pioneer Seed Company resolved to build a factory with one of 
its subsidiaries Pioneer Holdings, the two appellants in the case both acquired land 
in connection with the Pioneer resolution and Pioneer Holdings thereafter acquired 
the shareholdings in both the appellants. Thus the land in question was owned by 
the appellants, which was owned by Pioneer Holdings which was owned by Pioneer 
Seed Company. Thereafter, the Appellants then leased their land to the Board of 
Executors Pension Fund (the Fund). In terms of the lease the Fund could erect 
buildings on the land, which would become property of the lessors, but they were 
not obliged to do so. The Fund then sublet the land to Pioneer Seeds in which it 
was then obliged to construct the buildings for the benefit of Pioneer Seeds, for 
which Pionner Seeds then paid a premium to the Fund. The net effect of this was 
that the Fund was obliged to Pioneer Seeds to construct the buildings but was not 
obliged to the appellants to build the buildings.  
 
The argument on both sides focused largely on the application of two well-known 
legal principles. The first is the one expounded in The Duke of Westminster's case. 
The appellant arguing that the relevant law when correctly interpreted did not apply 
as the relevant section held that for the improvements to land to be included in the 
taxpayers taxable income such improvement “must accrue to the taxpayer in terms 
of an agreement; and the agreement must be of a particular kind viz an agreement 
relating to the grant to any other person of the right to the use or occupation of land 
or buildings” which right did not accrue to the taxpayer given that the leases in 
question did not oblige the lessee to erect buildings, given that the taxpayer could 
not enforce the erection of the buildings it followed that no right accrued to it, an 
interpretation of the law that the court found in favour of.71 The Commissioner 
 
69 1996 (3) SA 942 (SCA) 
70 Legwalia T “Modernising the ‘Substance Over Form’ Doctrine: Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Services v NWK Ltd (2012) 24 SA Merc LJ 115 – 127; Andrew Hutchinson & Dale Hutchinson, "Simulated 
Transactions and the Fraus Legis Doctrine" (2014) 131:1 SALJ 69 
71 Ibid note Error! Bookmark not defined. paras 12 - 15 
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argued that the documents did not reflect the parties true intentions, because the 
purpose was to avoid the tax the agreements were expressed to conceal the right 
to effect buildings on the land in question. 
 
The Court began its judgment by observing that “Affiliated companies are of course 
at liberty to structure their mutual relationships in whatever legal way their directors 
may prefer; but when, for no apparent commercial reason, a third party is 
interposed in what might equally well have been an arrangement between affiliates, 
it is not unnatural to seek the motive elsewhere”72 Accordingly, the Court found that 
the case centred on the application of two principles, namely the Duke of 
Westminster Principle and the plus valet principle.73 
 
The Duke of Westminster Principle comes to our law by way of the English case 
The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v The Duke of Westminster74 in which it was 
held, per Lord Tomlin: 
 
"[e]very man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as that the tax attaching 
under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be"75 
 
In effect then, the court held,  this principle is no more than the English equivalent 
of the Fraudem legis principle as shown in Dadoo v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 
and Commissioner for Customs and Excise v Randles, Brothers & Hudson that a 
person may arrange their affairs to remain outside of a statute, although the 
formulation above is broader, there is no requirement in the quotation above, that 
the arrangement be honest, as required by Dadoo v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 
and Commissioner for Customs and Excise v Randles, Brothers & Hudson. In 
contrast to the above, the second principle that finds application in this case, 
according to the court, is that "Courts of law will not be deceived by the form of a 
transaction : it will rend aside the veil in which the transaction is wrapped and 
examine its true nature and substance."76  
 
72 Ibid at para 8 
73 Ibid at 15 -17 
74 1936 AC 1  
75 Ibid at 19 




The Court found that the application of these principles is not mutually exclusive, as 
some have held but rather following the reasoning of Dadoo77 the taxpayer is 
entitled to arrange their affairs to avoid the application of the taxing statute provided 
that they honestly intended their arrangement to have the legal effect inter partes 
and the arrangement was not designedly disguising some other arrangement that 




“Provided that each of them is confined to its recognised bounds there is 
no reason why both principles cannot be applied in the same case. I have 
indicated that the court only becomes concerned with the substance rather 
than the form of a transaction when it has to decide whether the party 
concerned has succeeded in avoiding the application of a statute by an 
effective arrangement of his affairs. Thus applied, the two principles do not 
conflict.”78 (emphasis added) 
 
In discussing the Judgments of Zandberg v Van Zyl and Commissioner of Customs 
and Excise v Randles Brothers & Hudson Ltd, it was argued that once it is found 
that the parties intended their agreements to be cast in the relevant form, in this 
case lease coupled with a sublease and a building contract then that is the end of 
the matter, the substance of the agreements is in line with its form and the court 
must give effect thereto. However the Hefer JA held: 
 
 “This is plainly not so. That the parties did indeed deliberately cast their 
arrangement in the form mentioned, must of course be accepted; that, 
after all, is what they had been advised to do. The real question is, 
however, whether they actually intended that each agreement would inter 
partes have effect according to its tenor. If not, effect must be given to 
what the transaction really is.”79 
 
77 Discussed above in chapter 1 
78 Ibid at para 18 
79 Ibid at para 22 - 23 
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Since all the documents, the main lease, the sub-lease and the building 
contracts and the variation agreements, on behalf of all the parties it must be 
inferred that the parties signed each agreement with full knowledge of the 
terms of the other agreements. As such: 
 “the agreements cannot be regarded separately: they were all signed 
simultaneously and were plainly interdependent to the extent that none of 
them would have been concluded unless all the others were also signed; 
as appellants' attorney conceded, each one must be considered in the 
context of all the others in order to discover their total effect. So regarded 
there is a distinct air of unreality about the agreements… These anomalies 
are consistent with a wider, unexpressed agreement or tacit understanding 
the terms of which have not been divulged. As such they bear significantly 
on the question whether the accrual to the appellants of a right to the 
erection of the buildings has been concealed”80 
Thus understood the agreements bore a “stamp of simulation” and the appeal 
was dismissed.  
Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith and Another v CIR was a clear development of the 
simulated transactions doctrine in that it, if not developed certainly refined, the 
fraus legis principle by expressly confirming the ratio of Watermeyer JA in 
Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles Brothers & Hudson Ltd, that 
it is only once the transaction has been found to effectively avoid the 
application of a particular law under review that the substance of the 
transaction is evaluated to determine if same was nevertheless simulated. 
Further, this case appears to have developed the simulated transactions 
doctrine by emphasising the aspect of the tacit agreement between the parties 
as set out by Watermeyer JA in Commissioner of Customs and Excise v 
Randles Brothers & Hudson Ltd to the effect that even where the parties can 
be said to have deliberately arranged their affairs in a particular form, the key 
80 Ibid at para 26 - 28 
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inquiry is whether the parties intended same to have effect inter partes 
accordingly even where parties can show that they did intend their transaction 
to take a particular form the evidence must show that the form of the contract 
created real rights and obligations as between the parties and not merely 
nominate ones.   
 
The above case will be analysed in connection with its comparison with the case of 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services v NWK Ltd, accordingly the 
case of NWK Ltd will first be discussed before the two are compared and 
contrasted. 
Briefly summarised, the facts of CSARS v NWK Ltd.81 were as follows: 
The relevant parties were: NWK Ltd, a public company which traded in Maize, Slab 
Trading Company (Pty) Ltd (Slab) which was a wholly owned subsidiary of First 
National Bank Ltd (FNB) and First Derivatives, which operated as a division of FNB. 
In 2003 SARS issued revised assessments against NWK, disallowing interest on a 
portion of loans for the tax years 1999 to 2003 which SARS viewed as simulated. 
The loans in question were structured as follows: 
NWK and Slab entered into a loan agreement in the amount of R 96 415 776.00 at 
an interest rate of around 15% per annum. In payment of the interest NWK issued 
promissory notes to Slab totalling R 74 686 861.00. The capital of the loan was to 
paid at the end of a 5 year period by the delivery of 109 315 tonnes of maize, done 
by way of delivering Silo certificates. 
In order to limit its risk exposure to fluctuating maize prices NWK bought by means 
of a forward sale 109 315 tonnes of maize from First Derivatives, to be delivered  
again by means of a silo certificate in 5 years’ time, at a price of R 46 415 776.00 
payable immediately. As such in 5 years from the agreement NWK would receive 
109 315 tonnes of maize from First Derivatives and deliver to Slab 109 315 tonnes 
of maize.  
Thereafter, Slab discounts, by way of a cession, the promissory notes for the future 
interest payments on the original loan between slab and NWK to FNB for the 
 
81 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v NWK Ltd 2011 (2) SA 67 (SCA) 
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consideration of R 50 697 518. Slab further sold the 109 315 tonnes of maize it was 
to receive as the repayment on the loan capital on its loan agreement with NWK to 
First Derivatives for the amount of R 46 415 776 which was payable immediately 
whilst delivery was to be effected in 5 years’ time by means of a silo certificate. 
The net effect of the above transactions was that, in 5 years’ time, NWK would have 
to deliver the maize to Slab, who would then be obligated to deliver the maize to 
First Derivatives, who would have to deliver the maize to NWK. 
 From the outset Lewis JA noted that the burden of proof lay on the taxpayer to 
show that the transactions were not simulated and that the mere production of the 
agreements was insufficient to rebut the presumption that the transaction was 
simulated as they merely show the form in which the agreements were cast.82 
Further, the Court acknowledged that parties to a transaction are free to organising 
their affairs so as to avoid a peremptory law save for the fact that parties may not 
simulate a transaction.83 Relying on Zandberg and Randles the court confirmed that 
the parties intention is the determinative factor in cases where a transaction as 
been alleged to be simulated, however Lewis JA held: 
“…the cases do not consistently approach what is really meant by a 
parties intention in concluding a contract – what purpose he or she seeks 
to achieve and this warrants some investigation.”84 
Indicative of the above, for the Court, was the divergence in approaching the case 
by the minority and majority judgments in the Randles case, Ms. Justice Lewis 
noting that the courts in subsequent cases have favoured the approach of the 
minority in Randles, Brothers where both De Wet and Tindal JJA. 
The Court noted that the judgment of De Wet JA saw the fact that what was 
transferred in that case was an empty right which was temporary in nature, as such 
the parties could not have genuinely intended to transfer ownership by way of a 
Sale. Similarly, the Court noted that Tindal JA took issue with the fact that the 
82 At para 40 to 41 
83 Ibid at para 42 
84 Ibid at para 45 
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purchase price was never paid in Randles, Brothers, accordingly that the pretium 
was never paid. Contrastingly, Lewis JA reading of the majority judgment  turned on 
the fact that the parties to that case “so much wanted to transfer ownership of the 
materials, albeit that the transfer was but a vehicle for achieving another purpose, 
that they had intended to do so. There was no requirement, he held, that the right 
transferred had to be untrammelled.”85 
The Court noted that the subsequent cases the approach of the minority was often 
followed. Thus, in: 
 “Vasco Dry Cleaners v Twycross Hoexter JA examined all the peculiar 
features of a contract, ostensibly for the transfer of ownership, to 
determine the real intention of the parties. And in Skjelbreds Rederi A/S v 
Hartless (Pty) Ltd the court refused to recognize a cession of rights, 
enabling litigation, where it was clear that the successful litigant would 
have to retransfer the rights to the cedent after the litigation. Dishonesty 
was not in issue in any of these cases. But in each a transaction had 
been concluded to achieve a purpose other than that for which it was 
ostensibly concluded.”86 (own emphasis added) 
Contrastingly, the Court noted that in such cases as Hippo Quarries (Tvl) (Pty) Ltd v 
Eardley87 and CIR v Conhage88 the courts often looked to the form of the contract or 
whether the contract made good business sense. Here the court emphasised the 
dicta of Nienaber JA “Conversely, if their intention to cede is not genuine because 
the real purpose of the parties is something other than cession, their ostensible 
transaction will likewise be ineffectual.”89 In the oft quoted passage of the court, 
Lewis JA  noting the distinction between motive and purpose.90 The Court further 
noted that “in both Friedman and Conhage, where the courts held that the parties 
intended their contracts to be performed in accordance with their tenor, there were 
sound reasons for structuring the transactions as they did” as such the agreements 
 
85 Ibid at para 47 
86 Ibid note 4 at para 49 
87 1992 (1) SA 867 (A)  
88 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA) 
89 Ibid note 87 at 877C - E 
90 Ibid note 15 at para 51 to para 54 
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under review in those cases were both commercially sound and served a legitimate 
purpose.91 
Thus, it must follow that for the Court in NKW, the intention of the parties  must be 
inferred from the features of the contract and the purpose for which it was 
transacted and that the parties intention in transacting must be found to be in 
accordance therewith, hence Lewis JA found in the Freidman and Conhage cases 
the intention could be gleaned from the fact that the intention of the parties was to 
be found in the form of the contracts coupled with the clear and unmistakable 
business purpose that was found to be the cause of the transactions in those cases.  
Having thus analysed the development of the simulated transactions doctrine Lewis 
JA states: 
 “In my view the test to determine simulation cannot simply be whether 
there is an intention to give effect to a contract in accordance with its 
terms. Invariably where parties structure a transaction to achieve an 
objective other than the one ostensibly achieved they will intend to give 
effect to the transaction on the terms agreed. The test should thus go 
further, and require an examination of the commercial sense of the 
transaction: of its real substance and purpose. If the purpose of the 
transaction is only to achieve an object that allows the evasion of tax, or of 
a peremptory law, then it will be regarded as simulated. And the mere fact 
that parties do perform in terms of the contract does not show that it is not 
simulated: the charade of performance is generally meant to give 
credence to their simulation”92 
Applying the law as found by the court to the facts of the case the court held that the 
transaction was simulated, Lewis JA held: 
 
“What then is the real purpose of the loan in this case? Does it have any 
commercial substance or make any business sense? NWK agrued that 
the loan to it by Slab, like the sales…in Freidman Motors, was genuinely 
 
91 Ibid note 15  
92 Ibid note 15 at para 55 
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intended to have legal effect in accordance with its tenor. But as I have 
said the hire-puchase agreements in that and similar cases had good 
commercial sense. They allowed the purchasers to raise finance while at 
the same time retaining possession of the vehicles. And there was a 
genuine transfer of ownership. 
Was there any purpose or commercial sense – other than creating a tax 
advantage for the loan by Slab to NWK to be structured the way it was? 
Was there any genuine intention to deliver maize to Slab or a 
cessionary?”93 
Further the court held: 
 “This is not to suggest that a taxpayer should not take advantage of a 
tax-effective structure. But as I have said, there must be some substance 
– commercial reason – in the arrangement, not just an intention to
achieve a tax benefit or to avoid the application of a law. A court should 
not look only to the outward trappings of a contract: It must consider, 
when simulation is in issue, what the parties really sought to achieve”94  
Ultimately, applying the law to the facts the court held that the transaction must be 
simulated. The reasons given were that FNB and NWK entered into 2 contracts on 
the same day for the two amounts owing (namely R50M and R96 415 776); that in 
law the payment of money in exchange for a commodity is in substance a sale in 
our law and that the repayment of a loan in a manner other than money raises 
doubts as to the parties intentions, the payments in terms of the forward sale 
between First Derivatives and NWK and the agreement between Slab and Firs 
Derivatives on the same day in effect meant that from FNB and straight back to FNB 
with the addition of FNB’s facilitation fees; Barnard (NWK’s own witness) had 
conceded that the price of maize in 5 years time would have been impossible to 
ascertain; that the maize in question was vaguely defined by the parties; that no 
security was required for the maize, which seems to only make sense when one 
considers that the rights and obligations for the cessions cease on confusio; further 
the obligations to deliver maize were very much interdependent as “if one did not 
93 Ibid at paras 57 and 58 
94 Ibid at para 80 
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perform the other could not”.95 As such, the agreements between the parties were 
found to be simulated. 
 Thus, Lewis JA confirms that the principles established in Erf 3183 /1 Ladysmith 
(Pty) Ltd and Another v CIR and other judgements that whilst a taxpayer may 
arrange their affairs so as to attract the least tax the they may not do so dishonestly 
by means of a simulated transaction. Lewis JA’s judgment in this matter highlighted 
the theme discussed in chapter 2 which was made clear in Commissioner of 
Customs and Excise v Randles Brothers & Hudson Ltd – there appears to be a 
divergent application of these rules of simulation and fraus legis by our courts. The 
divergence, as noted in chapter 2, stems from the differing manner in which courts 
have approached the determination of the parties’ intention. Whilst some writers 
have viewed the matter as differing approaches as to whether the parties should be 
found to be dishonest or not, as a necessary precondition for a finding of 
simulation.96 It is submitted that a more constructive manner in which to view this 
variance within the judgments is that advocated for in Chapter 2, on the one hand, 
certain judges view the parties intention through the paradigm of the effects of the 
contract, evaluated against what the court understands to be the ordinary effects of 
an archetypal contract of that nature, whereas other judges evaluate the intentions 
of the parties against the available evidence and determine whether the facts are 
consistent with the ostensible intention or some other intention. It should be noted 
that after Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles Brothers & Hudson Ltd 
and  Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith v CIR the courts’ majority appears to favour the later 
interpretation in tax avoidance cases, this discrepancy should not be dismissed out 
of hat. 
On the reading of the case law by Lewis JA, De Wet CJ in Commissioner of 
Customs and Excise v Randles Brothers & Hudson Ltd preferred to look at the 
substance of what was done97, thus for Lewis JA the question was to determine 
what the purpose of the transaction was, what effects did the parties seek to 
95 Ibid at 29 
96 Hutchison, A & Hutchison, D “Simulated Transactions and the Fraus Legis Doctrine” 131 South African Law 
Journal 69 (2014). Cf De Koker “19. De Koker Chapter 46.7 “ Honest Simulation” in DE KOKER, A.P. & 
BRINCKLER, E. 2010. Silke on International Tax. [e-book] Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths. Available 
through: Mylexisnexis online.  
97 Ibid note 81 at para 48 
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achieve in structuring their transactions as they did. Thus understood the extension 
advocated for by Lewis JA is that in determining whether a transaction was 
genuinely entered into in order to avoid tax the real intention of the parties, and 
therefore the real substance of the agreement may be found by considering what 
commercial reasons / purpose they had for structuring their agreements in the form 
that they did; where the only benefit can be found in structuring the transaction in 
the form that they did would be to gain a tax benefit then the contract(s) may be 
said to be simulated. This can be likened to the ratio of Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith that 
the real inquiry was not whether the parties intended that the transaction take the 
form that it did but that they must intend that the agreements, cast in the form that 
they were, have inter partes the legal effect that they convey thus if we understand 
the extension of the test by Lewis JA in this light the parties performance in terms of 
the contract may be seen as merely part of the form of the transaction, what is of 
more import is what commercial justification exists for casting the contract(s) in the 
arrangement or form that they were. 
It must be accepted that Lewis JA clearly viewed the test for simulation as 
inadequate, that it “needed to go further and consider the commercial sense of the 
transaction” accordingly it is prima facie clear that Lewis JA intended to develop the 
common law, at the very least by extending the traditional test to consider the 
commercial sense of the transaction. Accordingly, it must be admitted that Lewis JA 
at least intended to develop the common law in respect of simulated transactions, 
what remains to be seen is whether this finding was a development of the common 
law. Can it be said that the consideration of the the commercial purpose or sense of 
a transaction formed part of the ratio of the court, in which case same would be 
binding and become a rule to be applied in cases of simulation.  
The terms of “commercial purpose”, “commercial reason” and “commercial sense” 
were used interchangeably throughout the judgement in analysing the transaction. 
The commercial reason for the transactions was indicative that they were genuine 
in CIR v Conhage98 and S v Friedman,99 further, Lewis JA qualifies the term 
98 Ibid note 88 
99 S v Friedman Motors (Pty) Ltd [1972] (1) SA 76 (T) 
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commercial purpose as being the real substance and purpose noting that where a 
transaction’s purpose is only to achieve some tax benefit then it will be regarded as 
simulated.100 Likewise, a transaction’s commercial substance or business sense 
was indicative of its real purpose.101 Further, that the cession by NWK to FNB as 
security for its obligation to deliver maize made no commercial sense as the 
obligations were illusory.102  Taken together, the court seems to hold that where a 
transaction did not have a commercial purpose then it would be considered 
simulated; where the rights and obligations ostensibly created by the transaction 
were without substantive content then they could not be what the parties truly 
intended. It is clear then that not only did Lewis JA intend to develop the common 
law but having thus given that development, that the test needs to consider the 
commercial sense of a transaction applied it to the case at hand, thus the reasoning 
of the court that the transactions lacked commercial purpose and this finding 
directly influenced the determination of the court that the transactions were then 
simulated. Accordingly, it is submitted that Lewis JA did develop the common law. 
It should be borne in mind that at no stage did the court in CSARS v NWK Ltd seek 
to overturn the jurisprudence developed by our courts in regards to simulated 
transactions, either expressly or impliedly. Accordingly, it must stand that the 
development proposed by Lewis JA, that the test for simulated transactions should 
go further and consider the commercial sense of a transaction must be seen as 
supplementary to the test as developed by our courts, this is evident in the very 
passage proposing the development – that the test should go further. Added to this 
is the courts finding that a taxpayer may validly arrange their affairs to avoid tax and 
its endorsement of the principles laid out in Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd v CIR 
militate against a new rule that would evaluate a transaction as simulated for lack of 
commercial purpose irrespective of the intentions of the parties. Thus understood it 
appears that the court would endorse the proposition that by “commercial sense” it 
is meant that the intentions of the parties to enter a transaction would mean that 
apart from showing that the parties intended the transaction to have the effects 
according to its tenor some justification is needed for the arrangement of the 
transaction in the form that it took. Given the reference to the minority and majority 
 
100 Ibid note 15 at para 55 
101 ibid 
102 Ibid at para 77 
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judgments in Commissioner for Customs and Excise v Randles, Brothers & Hudson 
Ltd  it may be argued that the extension of the simulated transactions doctrine was 
an attempt to reconcile the two approaches through the medium of commercial 
sense. Thus where a transaction is substantively not in keeping with ordinary 
contracts of that type, either because it has unusual provisions or creates rights and 
obligations not otherwise associated with transactions of that type, then the court 
may be moved to inquire as to the commercial sense of the transaction or require 
the taxpayer to justify their reasons for having entered into such a transaction. For 
example where the parties ostensibly enter into a contract of sale but the 
purchaser’s rights in the thing acquired are so denuded of content then it must be 
open to the court to evaluate whether, in spite of the performance in terms of the 
agreement, the purchaser would have entered into such an agreement, in short that 
there must be some justification. Where a transaction operates such that the rights 
and obligations appear to conflict then it is natural to enquire how they intended to 
receive a right which was without content, thus a party that purchases a wagon but 
gives to the seller all the rights of enjoyment of purchaser in an extensive manner it 
may be queried as to whether they actually intended to purchase the wagon in the 
first place, put differently that the purchase of the wagon was without commercial 
justification would entail, ceteris paribus, that the party did not actually intend on 
purchasing the wagon. 
Contrastingly, the extension of the test to consider the commercial sense of a 
transaction may have developed in order to evaluate the transaction when same is 
a composite one, consisting of many separate agreements. In Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith 
(Pty) Ltd v CIR the court was justified in viewing the separate agreements as a 
composite whole as all were signed almost simultaneously and by the same people 
that they were seen as interdependent. Likewise then, the test in CSARS v NWK 
Ltd could be viewed as a mechanism by which the court is empowered to evaluate 
a composite transaction consisting of a series of steps, not limited to cases where 
the contracts were signed simultaneously. Seen in this light the test for commercial 
sense of the transaction can be compared to the English case of Furniss v 
Dawson103 where it was established that where a taxpayer enters into a pre-
ordained set of transactions consisting of a series of steps and those steps were 
103 Furniss (Inspector of Taxes) v Dawson and Related Appeals [1984] 1 All ER 530 
40 
 
inserted with no other commercial purpose other than the avoidance of tax the court 
is empowered to disregard the intervening steps and determine the tax 
consequences from the end result.104 Whilst this rule is not in keeping with our 
understanding of simulated transactions in our law, it is submitted that mutatis 
mutandis the rule proposed in CSARS v NWK Ltd may bear some similarities, 
perhaps, in keeping with Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd v CIR the rule may be 
phrased that where steps have been inserted into a composite transaction which 
when evaluated under the rubric of commercial purpose/sense do not carry any 
weight, as where they do not appear to have any intended effect on the overall 
commerciality of the endeavour then the court may inquire as to the real intentions 
of the parties, irrespective of whether the parties apparently intended the 
transaction to have effect, as evidenced from their performance in terms of the 
agreements.  
Alternatively, Pretorius105 notes that whilst, previously, the courts had endorsed a 
subjective approach in determining the parties intentions when deciding whether 
the transaction was simulated, this raises some difficulties such as how the 
intentions should be determined and to what extent objective criteria can be used to 
determine a subjective state of mind.106 Further, whilst intention and purpose have 
been jurisprudentially separated, Pretorius does wonder whether the two can 
actually be separated.107 Thus Pretorius agrees with the Court in CSARS v NWK 
Ltd, that the application of the simulated transactions doctrine has not been 
consistently applied throughout its legal history, which then leaves room for the 
courts to apply their own personal sense of justice.108 Thus where a contract of sale 
containing terms typical of a loan agreement has been used to secure a loan and 
circumvent the usury laws, the courts have often held the courts have regarded the 
sale as a simulation and the contract of loan to be the real agreement although it 
may just as easily be said that the contract of loan was not intended and the 
contract of sale was.109 Thus objective criteria, such as the commercial purpose of 
 
104 Derksen, A. G. (1990). Should the South African courts adopt the English anti-tax-avoidance rule in Furniss 
v. Dawson. South African Law Journal, 107(3) pp 420 - 421 
105 C-J Pretorius 'Simulated agreements and commercial purpose – Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Service v NWK Ltd' (2012) 
106 Ibid at 688 
107 Ibid at 693 
108 ibid 
109 Zandberg v Van Zyl supra 
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a transaction, could serve as a supplementary criteria to evaluate whether a 
transaction is simulated where the available evidence does not clearly indicate the 
parties actual intentions. Viewed in this light the role of commercial sense or 
purpose would function like a supplementary rule of interpretation of the 
transactions in question, thus only providing relief where the facts or indeterminate 
as to whether the parties had the requisite intention or not.  
However, it should be borne in mind that this is mere speculation, the court gave no 
further guidance as to the meaning and application of commercial 
purpose/sense/reason as used in the judgment thus the exact ambit and application 
of this newly admitted criteria for the evaluation of simulated transactions should be 
developed by the courts.  
Thus it can be seen that from the exposition of the above case law the simulated 
transactions principle was not only accepted by the courts as a mechanism to curb 
tax avoidance but was actively developed for this purpose. As can be seen from the 
above discussion, whilst not necessarily always the case, transactions with the 
purpose of tax avoidance usually entail a complex series of transactions which have 
as their consequence the avoidance or reduction in tax. Further complicating the 
development of common law anti-avoidance mechanisms is the right of the 
taxpayer to avoid tax, otherwise known as the Duke of Westminster principle, that if 
parties have validly arranged their affairs so as to avoid the imposition of tax then a 
court may not thereafter use “the so-called doctrine of the substance” to 
nevertheless hold the taxpayer liable. Thus, it seemed prima facie that the principle 
of substance over form was inimical with the Duke of Westminster principle.  The 
case of Erf 3183 /1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and Another v CIR however resolved the 
conflict between these two principles by defining the right to avoid tax as only 
applicable where the parties had genuinely arranged their affairs, thus the first step 
in the simulated transactions doctrine was to determine whether the ostensible 
arrangement had the effect of avoiding tax. Further, it was held in Erf 3183 /1 
Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and Another v CIR that it was not enough that the parties 
actually intended that the agreements in question would have effect according to its 
tenor, what was required was that the parties intended the transactions to have 
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effect inter partes. CSARS v NWK Ltd provided the greatest development in the 
simulated transactions doctrine essentially extending the test to require an analysis 
of the commercial purpose of a transaction. Whilst one can speculate as to the 
exact ambit and meaning of this development how exactly this new principle should 
operate within the doctrine of simulated transactions should be developed by the 
courts, as one interpretation advocated in for in this chapter shows, this principle 
may be developed as a more robust mechanism for evaluating composite 
transactions. Both cases further illustrate that the simulated transactions doctrine is 
not limited to the consideration of transactions in isolation but that where a 
transaction is a composite one the transaction as a whole will be evaluated. That 
being said, it now remains to be determined how this development from CSARS v 
NWK Ltd should be refined and greater clarity should be given to its meaning and 
scope. In this regard the discussion in Chapter 4 attempts to give an explanation as 
to how this further development was treated by our courts.   
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CHAPTER 4: NWK RECONSIDERED 
 
That CSARS v NWK Ltd represented a momentous shift in our development of the 
simulated transactions doctrine cannot be disputed, at the very least it is evident 
from this that our courts will not shy away from raising to the challenge of meeting 
impermissible tax avoidance and developing the common-law tools to curb same. 
This chapter then looks to the treatment of the simulated transactions in light of the 
contentious developments in CSARS v NWK. Firstly, the reaction in academia and 
of practitioners toward this judgment will be discussed and the proposed 
understandings of the new rule created by CSARS v NWK Ltd will be evaluated 
against these concerns. Secondly, the reaction of the judiciary will be examined in 
the cases of  CSARS v Bosch and Another110and Sasol Oil v CSARS111 in order to 
determine how, if at all, our understanding of the doctrine of simulated transactions 
has changed in light of the cases discussed in chapter 3. Once given the judgment 
of CSARS v NWK Ltd caused some confusion amongst practitioners and has been 
criticised, applauded, and analysed extensively before the subsequent decisions of 
Bosch and Sasol, a brief discussion of which requires some analysis. This paper 
begins by providing some of the criticisms written of the judgment and how the 
interpretation of the judgment should be affected by these considerations. 
Thereafter the judicial reaction to the judgment of CSARS v NWK Ltd will be 
discussed. The discussion in this regard will be limited to CSARS v Bosch and 
Another112and Sasol Oil v CSARS113 as these cases were decided on the basis of 
supposed impermissible tax avoidance and as such would be best placed to 
provide an understanding of how CSARS v NWK Ltd has affected the development 
of the simulated transactions doctrine as a means of combatting impermissible tax 
avoidance, although the discussion will refer to the judgment of Wallis JA in 
Roshcon v Anchor Auto Body Builders114.  
Apart from Pretorius, whose views are discussed in chapter 3 above the case of 
CSARS v NWK has received little support in academia and from legal practitioners. 
 
110 [2015] 1 All SA 1 (SCA)  
111 [2019] 1 All SA 106 (SCA) 
112 [2015] 1 All SA 1 (SCA)  
113 [2019] 1 All SA 106 (SCA) 
114 [2014] ZASCA 40 
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However, Legwalia115 argues that CSARS v NWK Ltd changes the substance over 
form inquiry to review the substance of the transaction as not only what the parties 
really intended, as understood in previous cases, to now consider whether the 
transaction has the necessary substance that a transaction of that nature should 
have, thus for example “a transaction in which the risk element falls on a party that 
it normally would not fall on, or which lacks legal force where ordinarily it does, 
should also fail the test”.116 If by this the author contends that a contract that has 
unusual provisions which one would ordinarily not associate with a given 
transaction then by virtue of that fact alone the transaction must be said to be 
simulated then this reading must be rejected; whilst unusual provisions in a contract 
have been, and may be, considered as a factor in determining whether a contract is 
simulated, it cannot be extended to mean that in all cases where a transaction 
contains unusual provisions then it is simulated. This view is not only not supported 
by the case itself, seeing as the judgment of Lewis JA appears to approve of the 
cases of CIR v Conhage117 and S v Friedman,118 both of which were found not to 
involve simulations despite the transactions containing provisions unusual for 
transactions of that type.  
Broomberg SC119 argues that the court went too far and was too late in its 
extension on the principle as “the Legislature had already closed the door on the 
mischief that the Court was seeking to avert” and in so extending the rule regarding 
simulated transactions had usurped the Legislature’s powers. For Broomberg SC 
the new rule entailed from the judgment of CSARS v NWK Ltd was a clear 
departure from the principles stated in Commissioner for Customs and Excise v 
Randles, Brothers & Hudson Ltd if the new rule was to understood that a 
transaction will be regarded as simulated where the purpose of the transaction was 
only to avoid tax.120In effect, according to Broomberg SC, if we are to accept that 
the courts use of the term “tax evasion” it was meant “tax avoidance” then the court 
would have created a separate and parallel anti-avoidance rules which would then 
115 Thabo Legwaila, Modernising the Substance over Form Doctrine: Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Service v NWK Ltd, 24 S. Afr. Mercantile L.J. 115 (2012 
116 Ibid at pg 121 
117 Ibid note 88 
118 S v Friedman Motors (Pty) Ltd [1972] (1) SA 76 (T) 
119 Broomberg E (2011) “NWK and Founders Hill” Cape Town, The Taxpayer (vol 60) 
120 Ibid at paras 10 and 11 
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impermissibly tread on the legislature’s jurisdiction and thus offend against the 
separation of powers doctrine121. 
 
Kujinga122 has raised similar issues with the decision in NWK noting that the now 
added element that the transactions pass commercial muster would overbroaden 
the inquiry and that whilst this may appear beneficial in tax settings it would 
nevertheless complicate other areas of law123. Secondly, echoing Broomberg SC, 
Kujinga notes that this supposed new rule created by CSARS v NWK Ltd would 
have the effect of creating a more general anti-avoidance rule applicable to any 
avoidance arrangement whereas the older rule was more specific and only 
concerned itself with whether the parties intended to actually perform in terms of the 
contract.124 This overbroadness of the new test would create confusion as it would 
not be clear when the Commissioner would use the statutory General Anti-
Avoidance Rules and when they would use the common law simulated transactions 
test, similarly whilst Lewis JA acknowledged that it was open to taxpayers to avoid 
the imposition of tax it was not clear how anyone would be able to do this under the 
new conditions created by the court.125 Further, De Koker126 notes that even if the 
inquiry were confined only to the common law the notion that NWK introduces an 
independent supplementary test of commercial substance cannot be sustained 
given the following reductio ad absurdum: 
 
“Where, by contrast, a transaction is not disguised, but merely lacks 
‘commercial substance’, what assessment can the Commissioner 
conceivably make and what order is the court empowered to hand down 




121 Ibid at paras 19 - 22 
122 Benjamin T Kujinga “A Comparative Analysis of the Efficacy of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule as a 
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The argument being that where the transaction is found to be simulated as the 
parties truly intended some other transaction then the simulated transaction is 
ignored and the transaction truly intended is given effect because the court is 
empowered by virtue of the plus valet principle to do so; however, there is no 
basis in our law to disregard a transaction based solely on the transaction’s 
commercial substance. 
These concerns all seem to stem from the view that CSARS v NWK Ltd 
developed a separate inquiry apart from the real intentions of the parties and 
view the enquiry as to a transactions commercial sense/purpose as being 
something objective outside of the intentions of the parties. That the court was 
not clear in its formulation and thus created some confusion must be admitted; 
however, this alone is insufficient to disregard the clear development that this 
judgment made to the the doctrine of simulated transactions. Further, that 
these criticisms are correct, in that they highlight the issues raised where the 
new rule is understood to apply beyond the traditional scope of the simulated 
transactions doctrine and allow a court to declare transactions honestly 
entered into to be simulated on the basis of lack of commercial purpose, must 
again be admitted. However, it is submitted that these are merely reasons then 
not to prefer a reading of the development in these terms. Where, as 
advocated above the test is viewed as an evaluation of the intention of the 
parties, either as some tertiary rule of interpretation, a rule to the effect that 
parties cannot legally be said to intend transactions which are self-cancelling 
and appear to have no effect, or that the intention of the parties should be 
evaluated against the commercial justification of the supposed intention these 
concerns fall away. 
Hutchison et. al. was critical of the judgment in that it appeared to ignore the 
requirement of intention all together, arguing that it is contradictory to evaluate a 
transaction as simulated without a finding that the parties intended to simulate the 
transaction, where the intention of the parties may be derived from objective factors 
only if there is no direct evidence to support a finding of intention.128 However, the 
128 Ibid note 4 at pg 85 
47 
 
major criticism of Hutchison et al. is that Lewis JA apparently ignores the distinction 
between intention, to genuinely carry out the transaction in question, and purpose, 
the reason why the parties contracted.129 Further, this new objective approach 
toward simulation would allow for an objective determination of fraud between the 
parties, where a transaction which lacks sound commercial purpose being found to 
be a sham.130 Some of these criticisms have already been dealt with. 
However, the concern that the CSARS v NWK Ltd judgment conflate purpose with 
intention should be addressed, as this is exactly what it seemingly purports to do. It 
is submitted that if the courts dicta were understood to be that commercial purpose 
referred to the intended commercial consequence then this issue falls away. By 
way of example: Hutchison et al make use of the example wherein someone hires a 
car for the purposes of transporting marijuana. The resultant transaction may be 
invalid for being illegal, that is the purpose to transport marijuana is what invalidates 
the transaction. Likewise it might be said that where this miscreant hires the vehicle 
they do so with the expected consequence that they will be able to use the vehicle 
but if they were to enter into a contract of hire that debarred them from all the 
benefits expected from a contract of hire then it is difficult, and likely dogmatic, to 
maintain that they nevertheless intended to hire the vehicle, put differently the 
contract is invalid because the parties cannot be said to have actually intended a 
contract of hire given this apparent lack of any commercial purpose.  
The criticism was not limited to academia, Waglay J for the minority, in the 
case of Bosch and Another v CSARS,131 held: 
“…NWK cannot be read to serve as a precedent in this case where 
evasion is not the issue .In any event, any transaction which has its 
purpose tax evasion is unlawful as tax evasion constitutes a criminal 
offence in terms of the Income Tax Act, NWK cannot therefore be 
authority for setting aside a transaction as simulated by reason of 
being a vehicle for tax evasion as this is automatic in terms of the law. 
On the other hand if the words “evasion of tax” are to be substituted 




131 [2013] SA 130 (C)  
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practice in our Income tax law which permits transactions aimed at tax 
avoidance. Furthermore the confusion created by the judgment,
mitigates against it serving as a precedent binding upon the lower 
courts.”132 
Briefly stated the facts of the case were that the Taxpayers were employees 
of a high-end fashion retailer group of companies. The Taxpayers were 
offered the opportunity to enter into an employee share incentive scheme. 
In terms of the Scheme the taxpayers were given the option to purchase 
shares in the company which option was under a time-limit, both taxpayers 
opted to partake in the scheme. Delivery of the shares was to take place on 
two year intervals from the date of their notice date. Once delivery of the 
shares was made all risk and benefit passed to the taxpayers. The scheme 
allowed the employer to repurchase the shares in certain circumstances, of 
relevance was that the taxpayers were entitled to sell their shares to the 
employer if their value fell below the price paid by the taxpayers on the 
implantation date. The effect of the scheme was the avoidance of Section 
8A of the Income Tax Act, in that the full gain in value of the shares from the 
date of notice to the date of implementation was not taxable income for the 
Taxpayers. The Commissioner relied on the case of CSARS v NWK Ltd and 
argued that the resale provisions were uncommercial, that the resale 
provisions had no commercial purpose and were merely entered into to 
disguise the conditional sale.  
The majority judgment of Davis J in that case interpreted the judgment of 
NWK as not departing from the settled principles regarding simulated 
transactions in our law stating: 
 “there is nothing in the careful judgment of Lewis JA which supports the 
argument that the reasoning as employed in NWK was intended to alter the 
settled principles developed over more than a century regarding the 
determination of a simulated transaction for the purposes of tax… It appears 
that the intention of this paragraph is to point in the direction which the 
mandated enquiry must take in such cases namely to examine the real 
132 Ibid at para 9 of minority judgment 
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commercial sense of the transaction. If there is no commercial rational, in 
circumstances where the form of the agreement seeks to present a 
commercial rational, then the avoidance of tax as the sole purpose of the 
transaction, would represent a powerful justification for approaching the set 
of transactions in the manner undertaken by the Court in NWK. In this way 
the dictum in a relatively recent case of Scott JA in Mackay v Fey NO and 
Another 2006 (3) SA 182 (SCA) at para 26 can be reconciled with para [55] 
of NWK: 
‘ before a court will hold a transaction to be simulated or 
dishonest in this sense it must therefore be satisfied that 
there is some unexpressed or tacit understanding between 
the parties to the agreement which has been deliberately 
concealed”133 
Davis thus clearly was of the view that the CSARS v NWK Ltd 
judgment should be interpreted not as creating a new rule but rather 
in line with the decided principles of the doctrine already 
established. Although Davis J does allow for the possibility that 
where a transaction purports to have a commercial basis and yet 
none can be found this would be a powerful justification for holding 
the transaction as simulated. 
 The matter was clarified some a year later in the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in the case of Roshcon v Anchor Auto Body Builders134 where Wallis JA in a 
separate concurring judgment followed similar reasoning to that of Davis J 
above. 
In this case the Appellant sought to purchase a number of trucks which 
required bespoke fitment. The trucks were ordered from a Toit’s 
Commercial Property Limited (henceforth Toit’s). Toit’s in turn purchased 
the vehicles from Nissan Diesel (SA) (Pty) Ltd (henceforth Nissan) through 
133 Ibid at para 78 – 86 of Majority judgment 
134 [2014] ZASCA 40 
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financing provided by Firstrand Bank Limited (trading as Wesbank and 
henceforth referred to as Wesbank). Nissan and Wesbank thus concluded a 
supply agreement in which Nissan provided trucks to Wesbank. At the same 
time Wesbank and Toit’s entered into a floor agreement where Wesbank 
would provide financing to Toit’s as an authorised Nissan dealer. Thus the 
trucks that were purchased by Wesbank from Nissan were thus delivered to 
Toit’s. Toit’s thereafter caused the trucks to be sent to Anchor Auto Body 
Builders (henceforth Anchor) in order to make and fit the required 
modifications. Thereafter two trucks were delivered to the Appellant and the 
Appellant purportedly took ownership of the other three vehicles by the 
signing of a handover sheet, however these trucks were not delivered to the 
appellant as further modifications were required. Sometime after the 
Appellant made final payment for the trucks to Toit’s, however Anchor 
retained possession of the other three trucks as payment was outstanding 
from Toit’s for work done. 
Roshcon thus settled payment with Anchor but at this time Toit’s was in 
liquidation, accordingly Wesbank instructed Anchor not to release the 
vehicles as Wesbank claimed ownership given that Toit’s had not paid for 
them. Some months later Anchor then released the vehicles to Wesbank 
who then sold them to a third party. Roshcon contended that the floor 
agreement and supply agreements were simulated. It was alleged that the 
Floor plan agreement was in truth a loan against security of the trucks, to 
whit Wesbank did not take possession of same. Wesbank argued that 
Roshcon had not discharged the onus of proving the agreements were 
simulated. 
The case being decided on the facts of the case the main judgment per 
Shongwe JA does not appear to add any new insight into the development 
of the simulated transactions doctrine, however, Wallis JA took the 
opportunity to attempt to provide some clarification as to the law post-
CSARS v NWK Ltd 
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Having discussed the establishing principles of simulated transactions 
Wallis JA thereafter emphasised the fact that it was incorrect to view NWK 
Ltd as derogating from these principles. 
“In the income tax cases, the parties seek to take advantage of the 
complexities of income tax legislation in order to obtain a reduction in 
their overall liability for income tax. There are various mechanisms for 
doing this, but they all involve taking straightforward commercial 
transactions and adding complex additional elements designed solely 
for the purpose of claiming increased or additional deductions from 
taxable income, or allowances provided for in the legislation. The 
feature of those that have been treated as simulated transactions by 
the courts is that the additional elements add nothing of value to the 
underlying transaction and are very often self-cancelling. Thus in Erf 
1383/1 Hefer JA said that ‘there is a distinct air of unreality about the 
agreements’. In Relier Harms JA referred to the ‘unusual and unreal 
aspects’ of the transactions. The analysis by Lewis JA of the 
transactions in NWK clearly demonstrated that a range of unrealistic 
and self-cancelling features had been added to a straightforward loan. 
They served no commercial purpose, were based on no realistic 
valuation of the different elements of the transaction and were 
included solely to disguise the nature of the loan and inflate the 
deductions that NWK could make against its taxable income. In those 
circumstances the courts stripped away the unrealistic elements in 
order to disclose the true underlying transaction”135 
“It appears that in some circles this, and particularly the statement that 
‘If the purpose of the transaction is only to achieve an object that 
allows the evasion of tax, or of a peremptory law, then it will be 
regarded as simulated’, has been understood to condemn as 
simulated transactions any and all contractual arrangements that 
enable the parties to avoid tax or the operation of some law seen as 
adverse to their interests. But that fails to read this sentence in the 
135 At para 33 
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context of both the particular paragraph in the judgment and the entire 
discussion of simulated transactions that precedes it. If it meant that 
whole categories of transactions were to be condemned without more, 
merely because they were motivated by a desire to avoid tax or the 
operation of some law, that would be contrary to what Innes J said 
in Zandberg v Van Zyl in the concluding sentence of the passage 
quoted above, namely that: 
‘The inquiry, therefore, is in each case one of fact, for the right solution 
of which no general rule can be laid down.’ 
That was manifestly not Lewis JA’s intention...those reasons the 
notion that NWK transforms our law in relation to simulated 
transactions, or requires more of a court faced with a contention that a 
transaction is simulated than a careful analysis of all matters 
surrounding the transaction, including its commercial purpose, if any, 
is incorrect. The position remains that the court examines the 
transaction as a whole, including all surrounding circumstances, any 
unusual features of the transaction and the manner in which the 
parties intend to implement it, before determining in any particular 
case whether a transaction is simulated”136 
This position has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal on two further 
occasions of CSARS v Bosch and Another137 and Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd v CSARS.138 
On appeal in CSARS v Bosch and Another139 Wallis JA reiterated his findings in 
Roshcon discussed above with the added gloss that 
 “ If it is genuine then it is not simulated, and if it is simulated then it is 
a dishonest transaction, whatever the motives of those who concluded 
the transaction….for [the argument for simulation to succeed] it 
required the participants in the scheme to have intended, when 
exercising their options to enter into agreements of purchase and sale 
136 At para 35 to 37 
137  2014 ZASCA 171 at 40 
138 (2018) All SA 153 (SCA) 
139  2014 ZASCA 171 at 40 
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of shares, to do so on terms other than those set out in the scheme. 
That is manifestly implausible…”140Is the Honourable Justice Wallis 
correct in his findings as regards CSARS v NWK Ltd? It appears as 
though Lewis JA seems to find this interpretation to be the correct one, 
in Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd v CSARS she held: 
“In NWK I pointed out the difficulties inherent in applying this test. The test 
itself is uncontroversial. We must ascertain the intention of the parties 
having regard not only to the terms of the impugned transactions but also 
to other factors, including the improbability of the parties intending to give 
them effect. Applying the same test, the judges in [Commissioner for 
Customs and Excise v Randles, Brothers & Hudson Ltd] were divided in 
their approach to the application of the principle to the facts. 
 I suggested in NWK that 
‘[T]he test to determine simulation cannot simply be whether there is an 
intention to give effect to a contract in accordance with its terms. Invariably 
where parties structure a transaction to achieve an objective other than the 
one ostensibly achieved they will intend to give effect to the transaction on 
the terms agreed. The test should thus go further, and require an 
examination of the commercial sense of the transaction: of its real 
substance and purpose. If the purpose of the transaction is only to achieve 
an object that allows the evasion of tax, or of a peremptory law, then it will 
be regarded as simulated. And the mere fact that parties do perform in 
terms of the contract does not show that it is not simulated: the charade of 
performance is meant to give credence to their simulation.’ 
The judgment in that matter was apparently thought to have changed the 
law. It did not. It pointed out merely that in order to establish simulation 
one could not look only at the terms of the disputed transaction. And it 
suggested that simulation was to be established not only by considering 
140 Ibid at para 40 
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the terms of the transactions but also the probabilities and the context in 
which they were concluded.”141 
The Honorable Justice Lewis thus appears to have tempered her words in respect 
of simulated transactions. However, this is difficult to reconcile this reading, that the 
Honorable Judge merely held that in order to establish simulation one could not 
only look at the terms of the disputed transaction but also consider the probabilities 
and context in which they were concluded with her call that the test should go 
further and her dicta at paragraph 56 of CSARS v NWK Ltd where she held: 
“The Tax Court found, however, that Barnard of NWK had intended the 
transaction to have effect in accordance with its tenor. As I have said, that 
test is not enough to allay the possibility of simulation: one must have 
regard to the purpose of the transaction – what it is really intended to 
achieve.”142 
It is clear from the entire judgment in CSARS v NWK Ltd that the court felt the 
traditional test for determining the genuineness of a transaction with reference to the 
parties’ intentions, however that was to be determined, was inadequate. It was not 
enough to allay the possibility of simulation. Accordingly, it is difficult to agree with 
the Honourable Justices in the cases of Roshcon v Anchor Auto Body Builders,  
CSARS v Bosch and Another and Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd v CSARS that Lewis JA did not 
develop the test for simulation at all, however it is agreed that the case did not 
develop the simulated transactions doctrine to the extent that a transaction would be 
regarded as simulated merely because it has the purpose of avoiding legislation.  
Thus, from the cases of Roshcon v Anchor Auto Body Builders,  CSARS v Bosch 
and Another and Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd v CSARS it can be seen  that the fears of many 
in the legal community and academia that CSARS v NWK Ltd extended the enquiry 
in the simulated transactions doctrine to the extent that a transaction may be 
simulated irrespective of the parties’ intention were ill-founded. The courts in each of 
141 Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd v CSARS supra at para 57 - 59 
142 CSARS v Nwk supra at para 56 
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these cases were clear that CSARS v NWK Ltd did not have such an effect on our 
law.  
It has been argued that these cases clearly indicate that a transaction’s commercial 
purpose would be but a factor in considering whether it is simulated143 Joubert has 
noted that from a survey of the history of simulated transactions that the courts have 
considered the form of the contract, the surrounding circumstances of the contract 
and the unusual or atypical terms of the contract when assessing the genuineness 
of the transaction.144 He further notes that whereas the courts of the past considered 
the object of the contract, this had fallen out of favour.145 Thus, given the judgment 
of Wallis JA in Roshcon v Anchor Auto Body Builders the judgment of CSARS v 
NWK Ltd may be read as a return to this mode of determining a transaction’s 
genuineness. But as shown above this clearly could not have been the intention 
behind the judgment of Lewis JA in CSARS v NWK Ltd, as argued above, it was 
very clear from the judgment that Lewis JA felt that merely inquiring as to the 
parties’ intentions was inadequate, thus she could not have intended that 
Commercial purpose was merely a factor to consider.  
As noted by the Honourable Justice Wallis in Roshcon v Anchor Auto Body Builders, 
in the quotation from that case set out above,  where tax avoidance arrangements 
have involved taking straightforward commercial transactions and adding complex 
additional elements designed solely for the purpose of claiming increased or 
additional deductions from taxable income, or allowances provided for in the 
legislation a key feature that all those that have been held to be simulated had was 
that the additional steps added nothing of value to the underling transaction. It is 
submitted that this can only be the case where the court determines what the 
commercial purpose of the transaction was. It can only be determined that an 
additional step added nothing of value to the transactional arrangement if the 
purpose of the arrangement is determined. The case of CSARS v NWK Ltd thus 
expressly states this underlying and unstated premise.  
 
143 Silke on International Tax  LexisNexis (online Version) at para 46.6 accessed 01/02/2020 
144 Nereus L. Joubert, Asset-Based Financing, Contracts of Purchase and Sale, and Simulated Transactions, 
109 S.African L.J. 707 (1992) at pp  712 - 714 
145 ibid 
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Several possible interpretations of CSARS v NWK Ltd were discussed in Chapter 3: 
that the commercial purpose of the transaction be considered in conjunction with 
other surrounding circumstances to establish whether the parties truly intended the 
agreement, that commercial purpose be used a supplementary rule of interpretation 
regarding the parties’ contract where the facts are indeterminate or that it is a 
mechanism by which the court is empowered to evaluate a composite transaction 
consisting of a series of steps, not limited to cases where the contracts were signed 
simultaneously. The cases discussed in this chapter can be seen as clearly 
discounting the first option, this much is clear from their discussion. However, which 
of the others is the correct meaning remains to be seen.  
It is submitted that given the court held in CSARS v NWK Ltd that it was not 
sufficient that the parties intended the transaction to have effect according to its 
tenor but also what it attempted to achieve would indicate that the third possible 
interpretation - that commercial purpose/reason is a mechanism or principle by 
which the court is empowered to evaluate a composite transaction consisting of a 
series of steps should be the preferred interpretation, this is bolstered by the dicta of 
Wallis JA in Roshcon v Anchor Auto Body Builders that the common feature of 
composite transactions found to be simulated was that the additional steps added 
nothing of value. 
This chapter looked to evaluate how the courts have developed the simulated 
transactions doctrine after the case of CSARS v NWK Ltd. From the above 
discussion it is submitted that whilst no development of the law in respect of 
simulated transactions took place per se the law was certainly refined. The 
criticisms aimed at the judgment in CSARS v NWK Ltd were allayed in that the 
court, per Wallis JA, in Roshcon v Auto Body Builders where this interpretation of 
the case was expressly rejected. The views in these suggest that the simulated 
transactions doctrine will not develop into a generalised anti-avoidance mechanism. 
The views regarding CSARS v NWK Ltd, that it does not develop the law at all and 




CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis set out to examine and discuss how, and to what extent, the simulated 
transactions doctrine has developed in our common law as a mechanism to curb 
impermissible tax avoidance. Put differently, how were the legal principles of plus 
valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur and fraus legis developed as 
mechanisms to curb impermissible tax avoidance. 
Chapter 2 thus began the discussion at the early foundations of the simulated 
transactions doctrine in our law. It was shown that whilst the Roman law understood 
the two principles of plus valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur and fraus 
to be theoretically distinct they were nevertheless often jurisprudentially confused in 
the writings of the early jurists of our law. The defining features of a simulated 
transaction were thus laid out in our law through an intertwining of these concepts. 
In Zandberg v Van Zyl it was held that the plus valet principle empowered a court to 
disregard the transactions form where it was found that the real intentions of the 
parties differed from the simulated intention, that is to say, that where the 
transactions form does not accord with what the court determines the real intentions 
of the parties to be the court will enforce the real intentions of the parties. The fraus 
legis Principle was discussed in the case of Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp 
Municipal Council two understandings of the principle were mooted, the majority 
favouring the view that a transaction was in fraudem legis, and therefore in valid, 
where the transaction was mere a disguise for the real transaction in which case 
the law would nevertheless be applied, on this view the fraus legis principle is 
merely different application of the plus valet principle – echoing the jurisprudential 
confusion of the early writers. This view was shown to be the accepted view in 
Commissioner for Customs and Excise v Randles, Brothers & Hudson Ltd where 
the use of these principles in a tax setting were first discussed. In that case the 
majority, per Watermeyer JA held that it is only where a transaction is dishonest 
that it will be held to be invalid and a dishonest transaction was held to be one 
where the parties do not actually intend the ostensible agreement to have any effect 
between them but rather some other tacit agreement would be. Whereas, the 
minority view, per De Wet CJ, was to evaluate the authenticity of the transaction 
itself.  
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Chapter 3 then turned to discuss the simulated transactions doctrine as discussed 
in Commissioner for Customs and Excise v Randles, Brothers & Hudson Ltd in 
more recent case law. In this respect the cases of Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd v 
CIR and CSARS v NWK Ltd were discussed. It was clear from these cases that the 
courts were prepared to extend the simulated transactions doctrine to evaluate not 
just single transactions but composite ones as well. Whilst in Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith 
(Pty) Ltd v CIR the court felt justified in this owing to the interdependence of the 
agreements and that they were signed simultaneously the court in CSARS v NWK 
Ltd felt justified in doing so because of the lack of “commercial purpose” of the 
arrangement. The doctrine was also developed in Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd v 
CIR where the court demonstrated the application of the simulated transactions 
doctrine in relation to the Duke of Westminster Principle.    Various possible 
interpretations for what was meant by the term commercial purpose, as used in the 
case of CSARS v NWK Ltd were mooted which it was clear would require the 
courts to determine which would have been the better choice. 
Chapter 4 then looked to discuss how the developments in CSARS v NWK Ltd 
were received. Various criticisms of the judgment were discussed and the more 
recent case law where in the courts addressed the developments in CSARS v NWK 
Ltd were discussed. Whilst the refinement of the judgment in CSARS v NWK Ltd 
addressing the concerns raised by various critics were addressed the conclusion 
that CSARS v NWK Ltd did not develop the law was rejected. The various possible 
meanings of commercial purpose mooted in chapter 3 were evaluated against the 
reasoning the concurring judgment of Wallis JA in Roschcon v Auto Body Builders  
and it was determined that the better view is that commercial purpose be viewed as 
a principle which may empower a court to consider a composite transaction as one 
transaction when determining the consequences of a tax avoidance arrangement.  
Thus, the simulated transactions doctrine can be said to have been developed quite 
extensively from its early acceptance in our law towards the present as a means of 
combatting tax avoidance. In this regard the courts have shown a willingness to 
develop the law to find that impermissible tax avoidance transactions would be said 
to be simulated. However, the courts have, rightfully, shown a reluctance to develop 
the doctrine beyond the foundations of the doctrine. At all times it should be 
remembered that the simulated transactions doctrine invalidates transactions 
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because of a lack of consensus between the parties, they do not actually intend for 
the agreement to have effect inter partes, but rather intend that their real 
transaction is disguised. Thus, the courts have been clearly unwilling to accept the 
extension of the doctrine that would allow for a transaction to be said to be 
simulated even where the parties genuinely intended the transaction to take the 
form that it did. Nevertheless, the development of the doctrine of simulated 
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